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Loss Allocation in Strict Products Liability in
Illinois: Coney v. J.L.G. Industries,Inc.
INTRODUCTION

Before the adoption of contribution in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice
Division Package Machine Co.' and comparative negligence in
Alvis v. Ribar,2 Illinois courts allocated damages according to
the common law. There was no contribution among joint tortfeasors and contributory negligence completely barred the plaintiffs recovery in negligence actions. 3 In strict products liability
actions, however, the Illinois Supreme Court followed the Second
Restatement of Torts in not allowing contributory negligence as
a defense. 4 Further, if two or more defendants were found liable
for a plaintiffs injuries, they were held jointly and severally liable.5 Each defendant could be held responsible for payment of

6
the entire damages if judgment were entered for the plaintiff.
Under the common law scheme, therefore, a strictly liable defendant fully compensated the plaintiff regardless of the plaintiff s
contributory negligence or the harm caused by another defend7
ant.
In Skinner, the Illinois Supreme Court allowed contribution
between a strictly liable defendant and a defendant who had

1. 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), modified, 70 Il. 2d 16, cert. denied sub nom.
Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
2. 85 Ill. 2d 1,421 N.E.2d 886 (1981).
3. Skinner, 70 Ill. 2d at 9, 374 N.E.2d at 438-39; Alvis, 85 Il. 2d at 5, 421 N.E.2d at
887-88.
4. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 427, 261 N.E.2d 305, 310 (1970). Only
unreasonable assumption of risk and unintended, unforeseeable misuse completely barred
plaintiff's recovery. Id. at 425-26, 261 N.E.2d at 309-10.
5. Buehler v. Whalen, 70 Ill. 2d 51, 64, 374 N.E.2d 460, 466 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d
16 (1978). The common law rule of joint and several liability allowed the plaintiff to
proceed against any defendant and collect the entire judgment award, even if another
defendant contributed to the injury. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORS §§ 4748, at 295, 300 (4th ed. 1971).
note
6. Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, 10 iu. zd 28, 43, 139 N.E.2d 275, 284 (1956)
(defendant contractor held liable for plaintiff's damages as the result of the propane gas
tank explosion caused by the negligence of several defendants).
7. After entry of judgment for the plaintiff, the strictly liable defendant could proceed
against a third-party defendant for indemnity in certain situations. Burke v. Sky
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assumed the risk or misused the defective product.8 The court

applied comparative negligence principles to the apportionment
of damage between the concurrent tortfeasors.9 With Alvis v.
Ribar,the court adopted comparative negligence between a plaintiff and defendant in negligence actions. 10 Under the pure form
of comparative negligence adopted in Alvis, a plaintiffs damages are proportionately reduced by the fault attributable to
him.1 ' The Alvis court did not address the issue of whether
comparative negligence principles apply to strict products liability actions. 12 Nor did the court decide what effect comparative
negligence would have on the common law rule of joint and several liability. 13 After Skinner and Alvis, an individual defendant's responsibility for damages in a products liability suit was
14
undetermined.
In Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc.,' 5 the Illinois Supreme
Court resolved the issues of the application of comparative negligence to strict products liability and the effect of comparative
negligence on joint and several liability. The court applied the
defense of comparative fault to strict products liability and
defined the defense to include the plaintiffs behavior. 16 Additionally, the court retained the doctrine of joint and several lia-

Climber, Inc., 57 Ill. 2d 542, 316 N.E.2d 516 (1974). For the distinction between contribu-

tion and indemnity, see Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 624, 210 N.E.2d 182,
188 (1965) and W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 51, at 310.
8. 70 Ill. 2d at 14,374 N.E.2d at 442.
9. Id. See Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d at 28, 421 N.E.2d at 898.
10. 85 Ill. 2d at 25, 421 N.E.2d at 896-97. The Supreme Court of Illinois chose the
"pure" form of comparative negligence rather than the modified form. Id. at 27, 421
N.E.2d at 898. Under comparative negligence, damages are apportioned on the basis of
relative fault. Id. at 25, 421 N.E.2d at 897. See, e.g., V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLI-

GENCE § 3.2, at 46-48 (1974). The modified form of comparative negligence allows a negligent plaintiff to recover if his fault was less than or equal to the defendant's fault. 85 Ill.
2d at 24, 421 N.E.2d at 897. See, e.g., H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT

§§

4:34:4, at 82-85

(1978).
11. 85 Ill. 2d at 25, 421 N.E.2d at 897.
12. The Alvis decision was expressly limited to negligence actions. Id. at 25, 421
N.E.2d at 896-97. See Kionka, Comparative Negligence Comes to Illinois, 70 ILL B.J. 16,
18(1981).
13. In Alvis, the court left the "resolution of other collateral issues to future cases." 85
Ill. 2d at 28, 421 N.E.2d at 898. The opinion stated that "in those instances where applicable [contributory negligence] is replaced by the doctrine of comparative negligence." Id.
at 25, 421 N.E.2d at 897.
14. See Kionka, supra note 12, at 19.
15. No. 56306, slip op. (Ill. Sup. Ct. May 18, 1983).
16. Id. at 8-9.
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bility. 17 With the Coney decision, the court refined the changes
in the common law allocation of damages initiated by Skinner
and Alvis. 18
This note will review the background to the Coney decision by
examining Illinois case law on strict products liability goals and
defenses, the development of the doctrine of joint and several
liability before comparative negligence and after contribution,
and the policy considerations which led the Illinois Supreme
Court in Skinner and Alvis to adopt comparative fault principles
in allocating damages. After discussing the court's reasoning in
Coney, the opinion will be analyzed in terms of the underlying
policy considerations which prompted the court to apply comparative fault principles to strict products liability and to retain
joint and several liability. This analysis will explore the basis for
comparison in apportioning damages, the operation of the comparative fault defense to strict products liability, and the allocation of the risk of an insolvent or immune tortfeasor. The analysis will also focus on the impact of Coney and suggest a procedure
to implement the "equitable principles" articulated by the court.
BACKGROUND

Strict Products Liability in Illinois
The Illinois Supreme Court first recognized a cause of action
for strict products liability against a manufacturer of a defective
product in Suvada v. White Motor Co.19 The court rejected negli-

17. Id. at 13. The court also decided that the retention of joint and several liability
after comparative negligence does not deny defendants equal protection of the laws. Id.
at 14-15.
18. In Coney, the cause of action arose before the supreme court permitted contribution among joint tortfeasors in Skinner. However, during the pleading stage comparative
negligence became applicable (Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981)). There-

fore, the defendant in Coney could not take advantage of contribution but could challenge the allocation of damages on the basis of relative fault. In deciding Coney, the
court considered not only the issue of fault between a plaintiff and defendant, but also
the issue of liability for damages among the defendants. See, e.g., 1 J. DOOLEY, MODERN
TORT LAW §§ 4.03, 5.14.20, 5.14.30, at 93, 157, 161-62 (1982).
19. 32 Il. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). In Suvada, the plaintiffs purchased a used
tractor unit from defendant White Motor company. The brake system for the unit, which
had failed, was manufactured by defendant Bendix-Westinghouse and installed by
White. Id. at 613, 210 N.E.2d at 183. The Supreme Court of Illinois allowed the plaintiffs
to seek indemnity from Bendix, the manufacturer, not on the contract theory of breach of
an implied warranty, but on a theory of strict liability in tort. Id. at 619, 210 N.E.2d at
187. Therefore, lack of privity of contract was not a defense to the tort action against the
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gence and contract warranty theories as the only basis of recovery for consumers injured by defective products. 20 Analogizing to unwholesome food cases, the court noted that public policy
demanded the imposition of strict liability on the manufacturers
and sellers of unreasonably dangerous products. 2 1 In announcing the strict products liability cause of action, the court assimilated section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts.22
The goal of this theory of tort recovery was to protect product
users and consumers by allocating the loss to the manufacturer
or seller. 23 The Suvada court stated that, where the defective
manufacturer. Id. at 617, 210 N.E.2d at 185.
20. Strict products liability developed as a separate tort theory because negligence
and contract theories proved inadequate to address the problems of injured product users.
See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liabilitiy to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L REV.
791,800-05 (1966). The historical development of strict products liability began almost 150
years ago in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842), when a
passenger in a defective mailcoach was denied recovery because he lacked privity of contract with the manufacturer. Consequently, broad exceptions developed to the privity
rule. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 96, at 642. Judge Cardozo rejected the bar of privity and
held a manufacturer liable to the ultimate purchaser on a negligence theory in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 391, 111 N.E. 1050, 1054 (1916). An alternate theory
was developed in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960),
when the New Jersey Supreme Court held a manufacturer and seller liable to the ultimate user (non-purchaser) under an implied warranty (contract) theory. Id. at 363, 161
A.2d at 73. Following the argument of Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-68, 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (1944)'(Traynor, J., concurring), the California Supreme Court imposed strict liability in tort on a manufacturer for selling a
defective product that caused physical injury. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963). See W. PROSSER, supra note 5,
§§ 96-98, at 641-58.
21. 32 III. 2d at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186.
22. Id. at 621,210 N.E.2d at 187. Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the busines of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT
§ 402A].
23. 32 111. 2d at 618, 210 N.E.2d at 186. Justice Traynor succinctly stated the goal of
consumer protection, necessary in a technologically and economically complex society, in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963):
"The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather
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condition of a product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer, justice required imposing the economic loss on
the one who created the risk and reaped the profit.24 Courts in

other jurisdictions have explained that shifting the risk of loss
from the injured consumer to the manufacturer would allow the
profit maker to distribute the loss to the public as a cost of doing
business. 25 Four years after Suvada, the Supreme Court of Illinois articulated safety incentive as another goal of strict products liability. In Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Manufacturing Co., 26 the court reasoned that holding all the parts of the
distribution chain strictly liable would provide an incentive for
27
manufacturers and sellers to design and market safer products.
Therefore, the goals of strict products liability as expressed by
the Illinois Supreme Court were consumer protection, risk distri-

than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." Id. at 63, 377 P.2d
at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
The Suvada court extended liability for a defective product to intermediate sellers,
suppliers, contractors, parts assemblers, and component part manufacturers in addition
to original manufacturers and sellers. 32 Ill. 2d at 617, 210 N.E.2d at 185. Case law from
other jurisdictions supported this contention as noted in Suvada, as well as comment f to
section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts. See id.; RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra
note 22, at comment f.
24. 32 Ill. 2d 612, 618-19, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186. See also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 62 Ill.
2d 77, 82, 338 N.E.2d 857, 860 (1975) (allowing the manufacturer of an adjustable work platform to seek indemnity from a component part manufacturer and emphasizing the risk allocation purpose of strict products liability).
25. The policy of risk distribution was first espoused in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 22, at comment c. See generally
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MIsS. L. REV. 825, 826-27
(1973).
26. 42. Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969) (allowing a strict products liability cause of
action for a hammer which did not meet the consumer expectation test). See Note, Product Liability after Woodhill v. Parke Davis: The Failure to Warn as a Basis for Recovery, 13 LoY U. CHI. L.J. 523, 533-34 (1982); see generally D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS

(1982).
27. 42 Ill. 2d at 344, 247 N.E.2d at 403. Some commentators have explained that if
manufacturers were faced with potential liability and increased costs because of risk
spreading, then they would want to produce a defect-free product to maintain a greater
share of the competitive market. See Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of ComparativeNegligence, 43 Mo. L. REv. 431, 432 (1978); Holford, The Strict Limits of Liability
for Product Design and Manufacture, 52 TEx. L. REv. 81, 82-84 (1973); Wade, supra note
25, at 826.
As a corollary, manufacturers have the ability to anticipate hazards and guard against
their occurrence, which a consumer or user cannot do. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div.
Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill.
2d 1, 25, 372 N.E.2d 437, 448 (1977) (Dooley, J., dissenting).
LIABILITY: CASES AND MATERIALS
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bution and safety incentive. 28
However, as the court initially pointed out in Suvada, strict
products liability did not make the manufacturer or seller an
absolute insurer of the product. 29 The plaintiff must prove that
the product contained a defective condition which existed at the
time it left the manufacturer's control, that the condition was
30
unreasonably dangerous and proximately caused the injury.
Moreover, the defenses to a strict products liability action based
on the plaintiffs conduct developed concurrently with the nature
of the tort 31 Both the elements of proof of the plaintiffs prima
facie case and the defenses based on plaintiffs conduct pre32
vented strict products liability from becoming absolute liability.

The Illinois Supreme Court conclusively established the defenses to strict products liability in Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co.33 Following the reasoning of comments "n" and "h"

28. Inherent in the goals of consumer protection and safety incentive, is deterrence.
Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L REv. 723, 735 (1974). A manufacturer who had to pay substantial
damages would presumably stop placing defective products into the stream of commerce.
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liabiltiy to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099, 1122-23 (1960). See also Comment, Comparative Contributionand Strict Tort Liability: A Proposed Reconcilation, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 889, 895 nn. 45, 47 (1980). For a
general discussion of the public policy underlying the imposition of strict products liability, see Westra, Restructuring the Defenses to Strict Products Liability-An Alternative
to Comparative Negligence, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 355,363-64 (1979).
29. 32 Ill. 2d at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188. See also Liberty-Mutual, 62 Ill. 2d at 85, 338
N.E.2d at 861. For a general discussion of products liability in Illinois, see Buser, Strict
Products Liability Litigationin Review, 70 ILL B.J. 148 (1981).
30. Suvada, 32 Ill. 2d at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188. See also Rios v. Niagara Mach. & Tool
Works, 59 Ill. 2d 79, 83, 319 N.E.2d 232, 234 (1974) (holding that plaintiff did not prove the
causal element of the prima facie case).
31. In Illinois, the nature of strict products liability in tort is liability without fault.
See Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 454, 266 N.E.2d 897, 907
(1970) (allowing a cause of action for finding human blood as a defective product even
though the defendant hospital was not negligent). Moreover, negligence was expressly
eliminated as an element of a strict products liability claim in Liberty Mutual, 62 Ill. 2d
at 82, 338 N.E.2d at 860. The court stated that the purpose of placing the loss on the
manufacturer was best accomplished by eliminating negligence as an element of any
strict liability action, including indemnity actions in which the parties are all manufacturers or sellers of the product. Cf. Note, supra note 26, at 533-36 (discussing the difference between the consumer expectation test and the manufacturer defect test with
emphasis on the reappearance of negligence concepts in recent Illinois strict products
liability actions).
32. See Liberty Mutual, 62 111. 2d at 81, 338 N.E.2d at 859.
33. 45 Ill.
2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970). The defenses to strict products liability are
inherently related to the definition of a defective product. Id. at 421, 261 N.E.2d at 307. In
Illinois, "products are defective which are dangerous because they fail to perform in the
manner reasonably to be expected in light of their nature and intended function." Dun-
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to section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts, the court
held that assumption of the risk and misuse completely barred
the plaintiffs recovery. 34 Contributory negligence, defined as
"lack of due care for one's own safety as measured by the objec-

ham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 342, 247 N.E.2d 401, 403 (1969). For
an excellent discussion of the defenses to strict products liability in Illinois, see Kiselis,
Defenses to Products Liability in Illinois Arising Out of Plaintiff's Conduct, 10 LoY. U.
CHi. L.J. 229 (1979). For a discussion of defenses in other jurisdictions, see Annot., 46
A.L.R. 3D 266 (1972).
34. 45 Ill. 2d at 424-29, 261 N.E.2d at 308-12. The court defined assumption of risk as
"voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger." Id. at 424, 261
N.E.2d at 308. The court also followed the Restatement's position that assumption of risk
was to be measured by a subjective standard. Id.at 430-31, 261 N.E.2d at 312. Comment
n of section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts states in pertinent part:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence
consists merely in a failure to discover a defect in the product, or to guard
against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to
encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If
the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and
nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured
by it, he is barred from recovery.
RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 22, at comment n.
The Restatement's position has been the subject of extended discussion and clarification: W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 68, at 439-57; V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, § 12:5, at
200-201; Epstein, Products Liability:Defenses Based on Plaintiff's Conduct, 1968 UTAH L.
REv. 267, 280-83; Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA.L. REV.
122 (1961); Noel, Defective Products:Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 95-96 (1972); Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative
Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REv. 171, 177 (1974); Twerski, Old Wine in a New FlaskRestructuring Assumption of Risk in the Products Liability Era, 60 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1974);
Wade, Theories of Defense in Products Liability Cases, 12 TENN. B.J. 49 (1976); Westra,
supra note 28, at 364-73; Annot., Products Liability: Contributory Negligence or Assumption of Risk As Defense Under Doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort, 46 A.L.R. 3D 240 (1972).
In order for misuse to bar recovery, it had to be unintended and unforeseeable by the
manufacturer. 45 Ill. 2d at 425, 261 N.E.2d at 309. The court's treatment of misuse was
derived from the Second Restatement of Torts, section 402A, comment h, which provided that a product was not defective when it was safe for normal use. The manufacturer
may be required to give warnings, however, where "he has reason to anticipate that
danger may result from a particular use .... " RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 22, at
comment h.
Dean Schwartz characterizes unintended, unforeseeable misuse as grounds for finding
that the product was not "defective" and that the manufacturer or seller owed no duty to
the plaintiff. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, § 12.5, at 198-99. This type of misuse generally
bars plaintiffs recovery when it negates the proof of an unreasonably dangerous condition or cause of the injury. See Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill. 2d 1, 11, 310 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1974)
(explanation of the relationship between misuse and proximate cause). See also H.
WOODS, supra note 10, §§ 14:26, 14:36, at 284-87, 303-04, 112-14(s), 116-18(s) (1974 & Supp.
1982); Sales, Assumption of the Risk and Misuse in Strict Tort Liability - Prelude to
ComparativeFault, 11 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 729 (1980); Annot., 13 A.L.R. 3D 1057 (1967).

610

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 14

tive reasonable man standard," was not a defense to strict products liability. 35 The court explained that the policy goals which
led to the imposition of strict products liability demanded that
any defenses based on a plaintiffs conduct involve more culpability than simple contributory negligence. 36 Assumption of risk
and misuse, however, were complete defenses which operated
like the all-or-nothing rule of contributory negligence.37 In formulating the defenses to strict products liability, the Illinois

The Williams decision has been described as the leading case supporting the Restatement defenses to strict products liability. See Noel, supra, at 106-08; H. WOODS, supra note
10, § 14:33, at 296-98; Note, A Reappraisalof ContributoryFault in Strict ProductsLiability Law, 2 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 233, 239 (1976).
35. 45 Ill. 2d at 425, 261 N.E.2d at 309. See infra note 169 and accompanying text. The
distinction between contributory negligence and assumption of risk, and their application
to products liability, vary among jurisdictions. H. WOODS, supra note 10, § 6:1, at 114.
Prior to Williams, assumption of risk was available in Illinois as a defense only in negligence actions involving a contractual or employment relationship Barret v. Fritz, 42 Ill.
2d 529, 536-37, 248 N.E.2d 111, 114-15 (1969). Therefore, unreasonable assumption of risk,
which overlaps with contributory negligence, was not a defense in most negligence
actions, but became a complete defense to strict products liability. See Kiselis, supra note
32, at 240-41. For a discussion of the differences between assumption of risk and contributory negligence, see W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 68, at 440-41, 445-51; Kionka, supra note
12, at 22-23. Cf. James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185
(1968) (assumption of risk should be abolished except by express agreement and replaced
with concepts of duty and contributory negligence).
It should be noted that if the conduct of the plaintiff or of a third party were a superseding, intervening cause or the sole proximate cause of the injury, the plaintiff could not
recover because he cannot establish that the defective product caused the injury. H.
WOODS, supra note 10, § 5:1, at 94. See, e.g., Rios, 59 Ill. 2d at 84-86, 391 N.E.2d at 235-36
(manufacturer relieved of liability because plaintiffs employer equipped punch press with
a safety device).
36. 45 Ill. 2d at 426, 261 N.E.2d at 310. In Williams, the court explained: "We are
persuaded that the policy considerations which led us to adopt strict liability in Suvada
compel the elimination of 'contributory negligence' as a bar to recovery." Id. Placing the
economic risk of loss on the profit maker limited the defenses based on plaintiff's conduct
and increased the likelihood of plaintiffs recovery. Nielson, Strict Liability Actions Defenses Based on Plaintiffs Conduct, 32 FED. INS. COUNS. 189, 198 (1982). See Westra,
supra note 28, at 76-81; Note, supranote 34, at 239.
37. See, e.g., Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 357 F. Supp. 740, 753 (D. Kan.
1978). See also H. WooDs, supra note 10, § 14:25, at 282-84; Sales, supra note 34, at 756.
Presently in Illinois, unreasonable assumption or risk is an affirmative defense to strict
products liability; misuse is not an affirmative defense but negates the elements of product defect or causation in the plaintiffs burden of proof. Williams, 45 Ill. 2d at 430-31,
261 N.E.2d at 312; Lundy v. Whiting Corp., 93 Ill. App. 3d 244, 252, 417 N.E.2d 154, 162
(1981); Committee Comment, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2D, CIVIL, No. 400.08
(Supp. 1977). Misuse is defined as use for a purpose neither intended nor foreseeable.
Usually it is a question of fact for the jury. Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill. 2d 7, 13, 310 N.E.2d
1, 4 (1974); Lewis v. Stran Steel Corp., 57 Ill. 2d 94, 311 N.E.2d 128 (1974). See, e.g.,
Thomas v. Kaiser Agri. Chems., 81 111. 2d 205, 407 N.E.2d 32 (1980) (explaining burdens
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Supreme Court affirmed the policy goals of this new tort theory
and maintained the conceptual difference between strict pro3
ducts liability and negligence.
Before Coney, therefore, comparative negligence or fault was
not a defense to strict products liability. Consequently, in deciding whether to apply comparative fault principles to strict products liability, the Illinois Supreme Court would have to consider
the policy goals of both strict products liability and comparative
negligence. 39 If comparative fault principles were to apply, the
court would have to clarify the basis for comparison and define
the scope of the comparative fault defense. 40 The application of
comparative fault principles to strict products liability would
significantly alter the common law assessment of damages in
causes of action between a negligent plaintiff and a strictly liable defendant.
History and Policy Considerations
of Joint and Several Liability
Illinois case law refers to joint and several liability as "classic," "established," or "settled" law. 4 1 Historically, joint and
several liabilty arose from the separate theories of joint tortfeasors and entire liability. 42 Joint tortfeasors were originally those
wrongdoers who acted in concert, but later included those "joined"
tortfeasors whose independent, concurrent acts produced a single, indivisible injury. 43 Entire liability evolved from the princi-

of proof for strict products liability defenses). See also Kiselis, supra note 32, at 230;
Comment, Caveat Venditor: Failure to Heed Instructions Is Not a Defense to Illinois
Product Liability Actions, 30 DE PAUL REV. 477, 479 (1981).
38. Williams, 45 Ill. 2d at 425-27, 261 N.E.2d at 309-10. See Liberty Mutual, 62 Ill. 2d at
81-82, 338 N.E.2d at 859-60.
39. Strict products liability evolved under the common law rule of contributory negligence. Sales, supra note 32, at 762. The difficulty in applying comparative negligence
principles to strict products liability lies in superimposing a different system of assessing
damages on a pre-existing plan of allocating the risk of loss for defective products. H.
WOODS, supra note 10, § 14:42, at 312-13.
40. See Kionka, supra note 12, at 18-19, 22.
41. Beuhler v. Whalen, 70 Ill. 2d 51, 57, 374 N.E.2d 460, 465 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d
16 (1978); Storen v. City of Chicago, 373 Ill. 530, 533, 27 N.E.2d 53, 55 (1940); Paul Harris
Furniture Co. v. Morse, 10 Ill. 2d 28, 43, 139 N.E.2d 275, 284 (1956); Cornell v. Langland,
109 Ill. App. 3d 472, 440 N.E.2d 985, 988 (1982); Millburn Mut. Ins. Co. of Lake Villa v.
Glaze, 86 111. App. 3d 1055, 1065, 410 N.E.2d 295, 302 (1980).
42. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, 1 THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1, at 697-98 (1974). See generally
J. DOOLEY, supra note 18, § 26.02, at 539.
43. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, §§ 46-47, at 291-99. Joint liability historically has been
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ple that a tortfeasor is liable for all the consequences proximately caused by his tortious acts; therefore, any tortfeasor could
be liable for the plaintiffs entire damages. 44 The combination of
these theories produced the rule of joint and several liability, that
joint tortfeasors, together or separately, were held liable for the
total amount of damages. 45 The significance of the rule is that

imposed in four distinguishable kinds of situations: (1) the actors knowingly join in the
performance of the tortious act or acts (act in concert); (2) the actors fail to perform a
common duty owed to the plaintiff; (3) the parties have a special relationship between
them (e.g., master and servant or joint entrepreneurs); (4) although there is no concerted
action, nevertheless, the independent acts of several actors concur to produce indivisible
harmful consequences. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 42, § 10.1, at 697-98. See also
Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEx. L. REv. 399 (1939); Prosser, Joint Torts
and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413, 414, 429-33 (1937); Note, Contribution Act
Construed-ShouldJoint and Several Liability Have Been ConstruedFirst?30 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 747, 752 (1976). For the distinction between types of joint tortfeasors, see Morgan
v. Kirk Bros., Inc., 111 Ill. App. 3d 914, 919 n.2, 444 N.E.2d 504, 507 n.2 (1982); Seattle
First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 235-36, 588 P.2d 1308, 1312
(1978).
Although joint tortfeasors could be sued together, a tortfeasor could not compel joinder,
and the plaintiff could choose which individual tortfeasor to sue. W. PROSSER, supra note
5, § 47, at 296-98. Not only could the plaintiff bring separate suits, but he could also
pursue each to judgment and elect to enforce either or both. Id. § 48, at 300. See Comment, Multiple Party Litigation Under Comparative Negligence in Kansas-Damage
Apportionment As a Replacement for Joint and Several Liability, 16 WASH. L.J. 672, 674
(1977).
44. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 47, at 297-98. The substantive concept of entire liability arose from the practical impossibility of dividing injuries. If an injury were incapable
of being divided, then entire liability was imposed on each tortfeasor who substantially
contributed to the result. Id. § 52, at 314-16. Dean Prosser states that joinder of parties
and entire liability have been confused, and that an apportionment of damages should be
allowed if possible to divide the harm caused. Id. §§ 48, 52, at 298, 314. See F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, supra note 42, § 10.1, at 697; Comment, Recent Development in Joint and Several Liability, 24 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1319 (1973).
The issue of the confusion between substantive and procedural concepts resulting in
entire liability has been the subject of recent commentary. See generally Adler, Allocation
of Responsibility After American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 6 PEPPERDINE
L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1978); Zavos, Comparative Fault and the Insolvent Defendant: A Critique and Amplification of American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 14 LOY.
L.A.L. REv. 775, 783-85 (1981); Comment, Comparative Negligence, Multiple Parties, and
Settlements, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1264, 1264-68 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Multiple Parties];Comment, ComparativeNegligence in California,Multiple Party Litigation,
7 PAC. L.J. 770, 776-77 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, ComparativeNegligence in
California].As used in this explanation, defendant refers to the tortfeasor actually sued
by the plantiff or otherwise made a party to the action. A tortfeasor is any party who
contributed to the injury and may be subject to suit and held legally responsible.
45. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 42, § 10.1, at 695-99; W. PROSSER, supra note 5,
§ 52, at 315-20. The term joint tortfeasor was once limited to intentional tortfeasors but
now includes negligent tortfeasors whose individual acts substantially contribute to
plantiff's indivisible injury. Id. § 47, at 291-93. See Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc.,
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damages were not apportioned or divided because the tortfeasors
were wrongdoers who contributed to the plaintiffs single, indi46
visible injury.
Joint and several liability is the basis for third-party practice. 47 If one defendant were not held liable for all of the plaintiff's damages, then there would be no need for that defendant to
pursue a third-party claim against another defendant.48 Thirdparty practice evolved only because the common law did not
divide damages among the defendants or joint tortfeasors. 49 In
Illinois, the doctrines of indemnity, equitable apportionment,
and contribution developed to determine the defendants' liability
to each other for the plaintiffs injury.50 These separate doctrines
86 Ill. App. 2d 187, 196, 299 N.E.2d 769, 744 (1967); Appel & Michael, ContributionAmong
Joint Tortfeasors in Illinois: An Opportunityfor Legislative and JudicialCooperation, 10
LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 169, 170 (1979). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A comment 1 (1975); V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, § 16.3-16.4, at 252-54; Note, Reconciling Comparative Negligence, Contribution and Joint and Several Liability, 34 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1159, 1166 n.34 (1977).

In the common law tradition, joint and several liability in Illinois applied to joint tortfeasors who owned a common duty to the plantiff, Economy Light & Power Co. v. Hiller,
203 Ill. 518, 68 N.E. 72 (1903); Wisconsin Cent. R.R. Co. v. Ross, 142 111. 9, 31 N.E. 412
(1892) (joinder of defendants allowed for failure to keep property in repair), or whose
concurrent acts resulted in a single indivisible injury. Buehler v. Whalen, 70 Ill. 2d 51, 64,
374 N.E.2d 460, 465 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16 (1978); Paul Harris Furniture Co. v.
Morse, 10 Ill. 2d 28, 43, 139 N.E.2d 275, 284 (1956); Storen v. City of Chicago, 373 Ill. 530,
533, 27 N.E.2d 53, 55 (1940). See Carver v. Grossman, 55 Ill. 2d 507, 511, 305 N.E.2d 161,
163 (1973); Erickson v. Gilden, 76 Ill. App. 3d 218, 219, 394 N.E.2d 1076, 1078 (1979);
Littrell v. Coats Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 516, 521, 379 N.E.2d 293, 297 (1978). However, a

supervening act of negligence could break the causal connection and relieve the initial
tortfeasor from liability. Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 64 Ill. 2d 380, 395, 356 N.E.2d 93, 96
(1976); Seith v. Commonwealth Elec. Co., 24 Ill. 252, 89 N.E. 425 (1909); Millburn Mut.
Ins. Co. of Lake Villa v. Glaze, 86 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 1064, 410 N.E.2d 295, 302 (1980).
46. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, §§ 50, 52, at 306, 313-17. See Devaney v. Otis Elevator
Co., 251 Ill. 28, 39, 95 N.E. 990, 994 (1911); Caruso v. City of Chicago, 305 Ill. App. 571,
576, 27 N.E.2d 545, 547 (1940) (no apportionment of damages between joint wrongdoers);
Appel & Michael, supra note 45, at 170. Cf. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 42, § 10.1,
at 708 (implicit in the concept of joint tortfeasors as wrongdoers is placing the burden on
the defendants to apportion the damages).
47. See, e.g., Grey, Trends in the Third Party Practice,65 ILL. B.J. 448 (1977); Guy,
There Is Nothing to Compare in ComparativeNegligence, 71 ILL. B.J. 484, 487-88 (1981).
48. Note, supra note 43, at 752.
49. Comment, ComparativeNegligence in California,supra note 44, at 776-78.
50. Indemnity shifts the entire loss from one tortfeasor who has been compelled to
pay the damages to the other tortfeasor who should bear the loss. Suvada v. White Motor
Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 622, 210 N.E.2d 182, 188 (1965). Indemnity derives from contract principles, may be express or implied, and requires a pre-tort relationship between the parties
giving rise to a duty to indemnify. Muhlbauer v. Kruzel, 39 Ill. 2d 226, 230, 234 N.E.2d
790, 792 (1968); Van Jacobs v. Parikh, 97 Ill. App. 3d 610, 613, 422 N.E.2d 979, 981 (1981).
See W. PROSSER, supra,note 5, § 51, at 310; Bua, Third Party Practicein Illinois: Express
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did not divide the plaintiffs injury but instead shifted or reallocated the damages among the defendants. 51 Joint and several
liability ensured that the plaintiff was entitled to full recovery
from any defendant who proximately caused the single, indivisible injury. 52 After judgment was entered for the plaintiff, the
burden was placed upon the defendants to either reallocate the
damages or bear the loss caused by an immune, insolvent or
53
absent tortfeasor.
The policy considerations behind the common law rule of joint
and several liability were to hold the defendants liable as wrongdoers and to insure compensation for an injured, innocent plaintiff.5 4 The doctrines of third-party practice did not compromise

and Implied Indemnity, 25 DE PAUL L. REv. 287 (1976).
Equitable apportionment applies to those situations in which a second tortfeasor compounds an injury caused by the first tortfeasor. The original tortfeasor is liable for all
damages flowing from his negligence, but receives that portion of the damages from the
second tortfeasor caused by aggravating the plaintiffs original injury. Gertz v. Campbell, 55 Ill. 2d 84, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973). See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 52, at 320-21
(determining liability for successive injuries).
Contribution allows one joint tortfeasor to bring an action against another for an
apportionment of damages. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1,
14, 374 N.E.2d 437, 442 (1977), modified, 70 II. 2d 16, cert. denied sub nom. Hinckley
Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978). See W.
PROSSER, supra note 5, § 50, at 305-10. Skinner abolished the common law rule prohibiting contribution among joint tortfeasors, and the holding was later codified in the Illinois
301-305 (1979). See
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 70,
generally Horan, Contributionin Illinois: Skinner v. Reed Prentice and Senate Bill 308,
61 CHI. B. REC. 331 (1980); Comment, Comparative Contribution:The Legislative Enactment of the Skinner Doctrine, 14 J. MAR J. PRAC. & PRoc. 173 (1980). See also infra notes
56-58.
51. See Note, Ohio's ComparativeNegligence Statute: The Effect on Joint and Several
Liability,Absent Defendants and Joinder, 30 CIN. L. REv. 342, 345-46 (1981); Comment,
Comparative Negligence in California,supra note 44, at 777-76.
The liberal provisions of joinder in Illinois allow the defendant to implead a third-party
defendant who "is or may be liable" to the defendant for all or part of plaintiffs claim
2406(b) (1981). For a dicussion of the distinctions
against him. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 110,
between indemnity, equitable apportionment, and contribution, see Van Jacobs v. Parikh,
97 Ill. App. 3d 610, 612-14, 422 N.E.2d 979, 981-82 (1981). See also Ferrini, The Evolution
From Indemnity to Contribution-A Question of the Future, If Any, of Indemnity, 59 CHI.
B. REc. 254 (1978); Halligan, Another Look at Consecutive Tortfeasors: Responsibility,
Indemnity, Contribution and Settlement, 70 ILL B.J. 236, 236-41 (1981); Widland, Contribution: The End to Active-Passive Indemnity, 69 ILL. B.J. 78, 78-80 (1980).
52. Appel & Michael, supra note 45, at 178-80. For a complete discussion of joint and
several liability, see American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 587-90,
578 P.2d 899, 904-06, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 187-89 (1978).
53. See Appel & Michael, supra note 45, at 170-71; Zavos, supra note 44, at 780-83;
Comment, Multiple Parties,supra note 44, at 1265-68.
54. See Adler, supra note 44, at 15; Note, supra note 43, at 752; Note, supra note 45, at
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these goals.55 While the recent treatment of contribution in Illinois was evidence of the viability of joint and several liability
before comparative negligence, the decision in Coney would
decide the issue of whether this traditional tort doctrine would
survive after comparative negligence.
Contributionin Illinois
The Illinois Supreme Court adopted contribution in Skinner v.
Reed-Prentice Division Package Machine Co. to change the
inequitable rule of no contribution among joint tortfeasors. 56 In
Skinner, the court allowed a cause of action for contribution
between a strictly liable defendant and a more than negligent
defendant. 57 Specifically, the court recognized the manufacturer's claim for contribution against the employer which alleged
that the latter's misuse or assumption of risk contributed to the
plaintiffs injury.58 The court declared that equitable considera-

1170. The common law justification rested on the indivisibility of plaintiffs injury. See
supra note 44. See also Note, supra note 51, at 347-49.
55. Appel & Michael, supra note 45, at 178-80; Horan, supra note 50, at 337. See Comment, supra note 50, at 180-81.
56. 70 Ill. 2d 1, 11-13, 374 N.E.2d 437, 441-42 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16, cert. denied
sub nom. Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946
(1978). In Skinner, the plaintiff was injured while working on an injection molding
machine manufactured by the defendant. Plantiff sought recovery based on strict liability in tort. Id. at 4, 374 N.E. 2d at 438. The defendant manufacturer filed a third-party
complaint alleging negligence on the part of the employer. The manufacturer sought recovery on a theory of contribution. Id. at 5, 374 N.E.2d at 438. The circuit court dismissed

the third-party claim, and the appellate court affirmed. 40 Ill. App. 3d 99, 102-04, 351
N.E.2d 405, 407-09 (1976). The Illinois Supreme Court allowed the contribution claim
which apportioned the loss between the manufacturer and the employer. 70 Ill. 2d at 16,
374 N.E.2d at 443.
The court responded to the 1976 Report of the Illinois Judicial Conference which
unanimously recommended that liability among joint tortfeasors "be apportioned on the
basis of their pure relative fault." Id. at 7, 374 N.E.2d at 439.
57. Id. at 16, 374 N.E.2d at 443. Although the manufacturer's third-party complaint
averred negligence, the court in Skinner construed the complaint to allege misuse and
assumption of risk by the employer. Id. By this interpretation of the pleadings, the court
attempted to avoid the introduction of negligence concepts into strict products liability
actions. See Doyle v. Rhodes, 109 Ill. App. 3d 590, 595, 440 N.E.2d 895, 897-98 (1982);
Appel & Michael, supra note 45, at 182-85. The Illinois Supreme Court also liberally
construed the pleadings in the companion cases to conform to the Skinner rule. Stevens
v. Silver Mfg. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 41, 44, 374 N.E.2d 455, 457 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16
(1978); Robinson v. International Harvester Co., 70 Ill. 2d 47, 49-50, 374 N.E.2d 437, 446
(1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16 (1978). See Ferrini, supra note 51, at 263-64.
58. 70 Ill. 2d at 16, 374 N.E.2d at 443. The forceful dissent by Justice Dooley stated
that the Skinner court had indeed adopted a system of comparative fault. Id. at 24, 374
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tions required that liability be apportioned based on the relative
degree to which the employer's conduct and the manufacturer's
defective product proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries. 59
The goal of fairness to the defendants did not change the liabil60
ity of the defendants to the plaintiff, however.
The Skinner court specifically noted that indemnity and contribution did not compromise the goals of strict products liability
because the concepts of third-party practice were applied only
after the plaintiff was assured of compensation. 61 The language
and goals of comparative contribution in Skinner did not affect
the plaintiffs ability to recover, but only the apportionment of
the damages among the defendants. 62 Indeed, the Illinois Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, 63 which codified Skinner,

N.E.2d at 447 (Dooley, J., dissenting). Justice Dooley argued that the concept of fault had
no place in strict products liability actions. Therefore, the employer's fault should not be
compared with the manufacturer's product for apportionment of damages in a contribution action. Id. at 24-27, 374 N.E.2d at 447-49. See Note, Skinner v. Reed-Prentice: The
Application of Contributionto Strict Products Liability, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 165,
168 (1978). See also Zaremski & Berns, Skinner v. Reed-Prentice:Genesis of Comparative
Fault in Illinois, 67 ILL. B.J. 334 (1979) (predicting that Illinois would apply comparative
fault to strict products liability actions).
59. 70 Ill. 2d at 14, 374 N.E.2d at 442. It has been suggested that the court modified
the opinion in Skinner to apply comparative causation rather than comparative fault
principles in response to Justice Dooley's dissent. Appel & Michael, supra note 45, at
181-85, 188-92; Ferrini, supra note 51, at 270-72. The original opinion focused on the fault
and relative culpability of the parties causing plantiff's injuries. No. 48757, slip op. at 8-9
(Ill. Sup. Ct. Dec. 12, 1977). The modified opinion emphasized the causal elements of the
events producing the injury. 70 Ill. 2d at 14-16, 374 N.E.2d at 442-43.
60. Appel & Michael, supranote 45, at 170.
61. "When the economic loss of the user has been imposed on a Defendant in a strict
liability action the policy considerations of Suvada are satisfied and the ordinary equitable principles governing the concepts of indemnity or contribution are to be applied." 70
Ill. 2d at 14, 374 N.E.2d at 443.
62. A further indication that Skinner did not eliminate joint and several liability is
that the Illinois Supreme Court decided Buehler v. Whalen, 70 Ill. 2d 51, 374 N.E.2d 460
(1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16 (1978), at the same time as Skinner, and retained the common law rule. Id. at 59, 374 N.E.2d at 466. For a complete discussion, see Appel &
Michael, supra note 35, at 178-80.
63. Illinois Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70,
301305 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Contribution Act]. With respect to the issue of comparing
the strictly liable defendant to the negligent defendant the statute provides:
§ 2. Right of Contribution.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, where 2 or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury to person or property, or the
same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them, even though
judgment has not been entered against any or all of them.
Id.
302. The statutory language does not distinguish between negligence and strict
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expressly states that the rights of plaintiffs are unaffected by
contribution among joint tortfeasors. 4 Therefore, the contribution doctrine maintained the policy goals of joint and several
liability. Plaintiffs were fully compensated by wrongdoing defendants who later apportioned damages.
The Skinner decision was significant with regard to both
major issues before the court in Coney. First, using comparative
causation as a basis for apportioning liability for damages
between concurrent tortfeasors, the Illinois Supreme Court estab65
lished the comparative fault analysis applicable to Illinois.
Second, the court ensured the compensation of an injured plaintiff by adopting contribution on the traditional foundation of
joint and several liability. 66 The decision in Coney would rest in
part on the policy considerations and comparative basis delineated by the court in Skinner as well as Alvis.
Before the adoption of comparative negligence, therefore, the
strong policy goals of strict products liability severely restricted
the defenses to a products liability action. Not only were the
defenses carefully circumscribed, but the defendants were held
jointly and severally liable for plaintiffs injuires. An injured
plaintiff, even if contributorily negligent, received full compensation from a strictly liable defendant. Moreover, joint and several
liability remained a viable rule even after Illinois adopted contribution. 67 Contribution only affected the allocation of damages
among the defendants; it did not affect the determination of liability and damages between plaintiff and defendants. 68 In Coney,
the Illinois Supreme Court would examine the defenses to strict
products liability and the doctrine of joint and several liability in
light of the policy considerations of comparative negligence
espoused in Alvis v. Ribar.

products liability. Also, the basis of comparison is relative culpability. Section 3 provides
"Amount of Contribution. The pro rata share of each tortfeasor shall be determined in

accordance with his relative culpability." Id. 303. See Horan, supra note 50, at 332.
64. Section 4 states: "Rights of Plaintiff Unaffected. A plaintiffs right to recover the
full amount of his judgment from any one or more defendants subject to liability in tort
for the same injury to person or property, or for wrongful death, is not affected by the
provisions of this Act." Contribution Act, supra note 63, 304.
65. See supra note 59. See also Coney, No. 56306, slip op. at 8. The court required more
culpability than negligence on the part of the third-party defendant to qualify for damage
apportionment with a strictly liable defendant.
66. See supra note 62. See also No. 56306, slip op. at 12-13.
67. Horan, supra note 50, at 335; Comment, supra note 50, at 181.
68. Appel & Michael, supranote 45, at 170-71.
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ComparativeNegligence in Illinois
The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of pure comparative negligence in Alvis v. Ribar to alleviate the harshness
of the common law rule of contributory negligence. 69 The all-ornothing rule of contributory negligence had completely barred a
culpable plaintiff from recovery.7 0 In Alvis and its companion
case, Krohn v. Abbott Laboratories,Inc.,71 the plaintiffs' negligence had contributed to their injuires. Instead of finding contributory negligence to be a complete defense, the holding of
Alvis required that the plaintiffs damages be proportionately

69. 85 Ill. 2d 1, 15-25, 421 N.E.2d 886, 892-97 (1981). The court reviewed the history of
contributory negligence from Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B.
1809) ("want of ordinary care ... by the plaintiff" barring plaintiffs recovery) to its
acceptance in Illinois in Aurora Branch R.R. Co. v. Grimes, 13 Ill. 585 (1858) (adding the
requirement that plaintiff prove defendant's negligence and own lack of negligence).

Next the court noted the brief Illinois history of comparative negligence adopted in Galena & Chicago Union R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478 (1858) (allowing plaintiff to recover
where his negligence was slight and defendant's was gross). This approach was based on
measurement of degrees of negligence and was abandoned in Calumet Iron & Steel Co. v.
Martin, 115 Ill. 358, 368-69,3 N.E.2d 456, 461-64 (1885) and City of Lanark v. Dougherty,
153 Ill. 163, 164, 38 N.E.2d 892, 892 (1894). See 85 Ill. 2d at 5-15, 421 N.E.2d at 887-92. See
Note, Pure ComparativeNegligence in Illinois: Alvis v. Ribar, 12 CHI. KENT L. REv. 599,
600-05 (1981).
The court noted with approval comparative negligence in federal statutes, e.g., Federal
Employer's Liability Act of 1908, 45 U.S.C. § 33 (1976) and its adoption in thirty-six
states, and concluded with a quote from Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638,
653, 275 N.E.2d 511, 515 (1979): "This precedent is so compelling that the question before
remaining courts and legislatures is not whether but when, how and in what form to
follow this lead." 85 Ill. 2d at 15, 421 N.E.2d at 892.
70. 85 Ill. 2d at 7, 9, 421 N.E.2d at 888, 890. The court identified the exceptions that
had developed to avoid the all-or-nothing rule: "willful," "wanton," or "reckless" conduct
of the defendant, defendant's violation of a statute, and the last clear chance doctrine.
Id. at 10-11, 421 N.E.2d at 890. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, § 1.2, at 5-8; H. WOODS,
supra note 10, §§ 1.6-1:7, at 11-15; Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 1,
5-7 (1953). Prosser also suggests that contributory "fault" would be a more descriptive
term because negligence connotes a duty to someone else, where contributory negligence
involves no duty except to prevent an undue risk of harm to the plaintiff himself. W.
PROSSER, supra note 5,§ 65, at 418.
71. 85 Ill. 2d 4, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981). In Alvis, the plaintiff was injured as a result of
the collision between a motor vehicle and a stop sign. Plaintiff filed a multicount personal injury suit seeking damages from Ribar and two other defendants. Id. at 4, 421
N.E.2d at 887. See Franzese v. Katz, 78 Ill. App. 3d 1117, 398 N.E.2d 124 (1979), rev'd sub
nom. Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981).
In Krohn, plaintiffs decedent was fatally injured in a collision with a tractor-trailer
owned by defendant, Abbott Laboratories, Inc. Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action
against two defendants, the owner and the operator of the tractor-trailer. 85 Ill. 2d at 4-5,
421 N.E.2d at 887. In each case, the plaintiffs complaint included a count based on comparative negligence which was dismissed by the trial court upon motion by the defendants. Id. at 4, 421 N.E.2d at 887.
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reduced by the fault attributable to him.7 2

In Alvis, the court reasoned that the policy of apportioning a
loss between a negligent plaintiff and defendant was more equi73
table than the common law rule of contributory negligence.
Furthermore, the adoption of comparative negligence would promote respect for the law by allowing juries to decide negligence
cases on a rule of law rather than on a disregard of the court's
instructions.7 4 In abolishing contributory negligence, the court
did not specifically address what effect comparative negligence
would have on the doctrines of strict products liability and joint
and several liability.7 5 With respect to multiple parties, however,
the court did state that the collateral issue of contribution among
joint tortfeasors had been resolved by the comparative principles
in Skinner.76

72. Ill. 2d at 27-28, 421 N.E.2d at 898. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, § 3.2, at 46.
Professor Schwartz states that the jury first establishes that both plaintiff and defendant
proximately caused the injury and then allocates the fault to each party. Id. § 17.1, at
275. Therefore, the jury has to decide if both parties are negligent before determining
relative fault. Id. See also Fischer, supra note 27, at 438; Fleming, Forward,Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 239, 249 (1976); Prosser,
ComparativeNegligence, 51 MICH. L. REv. 465, 481 (1953).
In discussing the form of comparative negligence the court stated: "Under the 'pure'
form, the plaintiffs damages are simply reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to
him." 85 Ill. 2d at 25, 421 N.E.2d at 897.
73. 85 Ill. 2d at 15-25, 421 N.E.2d at 892-97. The court stated that "the 'pure' form of
comparative negligence is the only system which truly apportions damages according to
the relative fault of the parties and, thus, achieves total justice." Id. at 27, 421 N.E.2d at
898. The court also rejected the modified form of contributory negligence which allowed a
49% negligent defendant to escape liability because it was as arbitrary as contributory
negligence. Id. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 827, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858, 874 (1975). The court noted that other authorities advocating a pure system as opposed to modified included: United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397,
406 (1975); V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, § 21.3, at 347; Prosser, supra note 72, at 23-25. See
supra note 10.
74. 85 Ill. 2d at 20-21, 421 N.E.2d at 894-95. It has been suggested that juries ignored
the harshness of the contributory negligence rule and reached verdicts by a common
sense relative culpability approach. Id. In fact, the imposition of contributory negligence
was seen as a way of controlling juries' sympathies. Id. at 6, 421 N.E.2d at 888. H.
WOODS, supra note 10, §§ 1:4-1:5, at 7-11. The Court concluded that there was something
inherently wrong with a system of justice which required juries to disregard the law. 85
Ill. 2d at 13, 421 N.E.2d at 894. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 811, 432 P.2d
1226, 1231, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 863 (1975); Hoffnan v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 437 (Fla.
1973). See also V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, § 21.1, at 338; Fischer, supra note 27, at 432;
Fleming, supra note 72, at 242-43.
75. See supra notes 12-13.
76. 85 ill. 2d at 28, 421 N.E.2d 898. The court also mentioned that the statutory codification of Skinner was controlling on the issue of contribution among joint tortfeasors. Id.
See supra notes 63-64.
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In Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc., the Illinois Supreme Court
accepted the opportunity to rule on the application of comparative fault principles to strict products liability and to determine
its effect on joint and several liability. The court had to reconcile
the policy considerations of each doctrine with the goal of comparative negligence as announced in Alvis: to apportion loss on
the basis of relative fault. If comparative fault principles applied
to strict products liability and joint and several liability, the
court would necessarily change the common law allocation of
damages in Illinois. In resolving both major issues in Coney, the
court ulimately determined the extent of the defendants' liability
to the plaintiff in a strict products liability action.
CONEY v. J.L.G. INDUSTRIES, INC.
Jack A. Coney, plaintiff and administrator of the estate of
Clifford M. Jaspar, deceased, filed a suit against J.L.G. Industries, Inc., seeking recovery under a theory of strict products liability. 77 Plaintiff alleged that Jaspar died as a result of injuries
proximately caused by the unreasonably dangerous condition
existing in the aerial work platform manufactured by the defendant.78 The defendant denied these allegations and raised two

77. No. 56306, slip op. at 1 (111. Sup. Ct. May 18, 1983). The complaint sought damages
under the Wrongful Death and Survival Acts. Id. Complaint at 1. The Wrongful Death
Act provides that the representative of the decedent may pursue an action for damages
against "the person who or company or corporation which would have been liable if

death had not ensued .... " Wrongful Death Act, ILL REV. STAT. ch. 70, 1 (1981). The
Survival Act allows "actions to recover damages for an injury to the person" to pass to
the estate of the decedent upon the death of the injured person. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2,
27-6 (1981). For a discussion of the distinction between the Wrongful Death and Survival Acts, see Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., 56 Ill. 2d 423, 426-27, 308 N.E.2d 583, 586; W.
PROSSER, supra note 5, §§ 126-127, at 901, 906.
The original and amended complaints named Weise Planning and Engineering Inc.,
the distributor of the work platform, as a party defendant. No. 56306, Complaint at 1.
However, these counts were voluntarily dismissed upon motion by the plaintiff in the
Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Illinois. The plaintiff could not pursue a
common law claim against the decedent's employer because the employer was subject to
statutory liability under the Worker's Compensation Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, §§ 138.1138.30 (1981). See infra note 81.
78. Brief for Appellant at 7, Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., No. 56306 (Ill. Sup. Ct. May
18, 1983). Specifically, the complaint alleged that the bucket of the hydraulic manlift in
which decedent was working abruptly shifted position injuring the decedent. Id. Plaintiff's decedent died five days after the occurrence. Plaintiff averred that the equipment
operated by the decedent at his workplace was defective because it lacked sufficient
warning devices. Brief for Appellee at 10.
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affirmative defenses. 79 The defendent claimed that the negligence or fault of both the decedent and the decedent's employer,
V. Jobst & Sons, Inc., was a proximate and substantial cause of
the decedent's injury and death. 80 Under existing Illinois law,
the defendant could not pursue a third-party claim against the
employer for contribution or indemnity, and instead sought to
limit its liability to its relative fault.81

79. Brief for Appellant at 7.
80. No. 56306, slip op. at 1. The first affirmative defense claimed that the decedent
was guilty of comparative negligence or fault in operating the hydraulic manlift. The
second affirmative defense asserted that the decedent's employer was guilty of comparative negligence or fault in failing to train the decedent in the proper operation of the work
platform. Id. In effect, defendant claimed that comparative negligence should proportionately reduce plaintiffs recovery by the fault attributable to the plaintiff and to others
contributing to the injury.
81.
Id. Defendant was unable to file a third-party claim for contribution against the
employer because the injury occurred before March 1, 1978. The Skinner rule and statutory codification limits claims for contribution to "causes of action arising out of occurrences on and after March 1, 1978." 70 Ill. 2d at 16, 374 N.E.2d at 444. See Old Second
Nat'l Bank v. Bynal Prods., Inc., 79 Ill. App. 3d 432, 434, 398 N.E.2d 626, 628 (1979)
(statutory language "causes of action arising on or after March 1, 1978" refers to torts
committed not judgments paid); Verson Allsteel Press Co. v. Major Spring & Mfg. Co.,
105 Ill. App. 3d 419, 422, 434 N.E.2d 456, 459 (1982) (statutory codification intended to
follow the principles and prospective rule of Skinner). See supra notes 63-64.
Also, the defendant manufacturer could not seek indemnity in a third-party action
from a "downstream" employer or supplier under an implied indemnity theory. Burke v.
Sky Climber, Inc., 57 Ill. 2d 542, 546, 316 N.E.2d 516, 519 (1975); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, 81-82, 338 N.E.2d 857, 859-60 (1975). See Note,
supra note 58, at 176-77. By filing the affirmative defenses, therefore, defendant sought to
reduce its liability to its percentage of fault. No. 56306, slip op. at 1. Defendant filed the
affirmative defenses within one month after the Alvis v. Ribar decision. The rule in Alvis
specifically applied to "all cases in which trial commences on or after June 8, 1981." 85
Ill. 2d at 28, 421 N.E.2d at 898.
Thus, Coney squarely raises the issue of which party should bear the loss of an
immune tortfeasor. The employer is immune from suit because of the statutory liability of
workers' compensation. The Illinois Workers' Compensation Act provides in pertinent
part:
(a) No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer
[or] his insurer.., for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged
in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein
provided, is available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of the
Act.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch 48,
138.5(a) (1981). The injured worker receives compensation from
his employer according to the statutory benefit schedule, regardless of fault. See 2A A.
LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 65, at 135-51 (1976); Mitchell, ProductsLiability,
Workers' Compensation and the IndustrialAccident, 14 DuQ. L REV. 349,352 (1976).
The operation of the workers' compensation system raises questions concerning the
fairness to all litigants in the apportionment of damages in workplace settings. See
Skinner, 70 111. 2d at 20-21, 374 N.E.2d at 445-46 (Underwood, J., dissenting); id. at 33-36,
374 N.E.2d at 452-53 (Dooley, J., dissenting); 2A A. LARSON, supra,§§ 76.10-76.42, at 227-
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The plaintiff moved to strike both affirmative defenses on the
grounds that comparative negligence was inapplicable to strict
products liability and did not abrogate the common law doctrine
of joint and several liability.8 2 The trial court granted the motion
3
to strike but certified three questions for appeal.8
In an unpublished order, the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Third Judicial District denied the defendant's application for
leave to appeal, stating that the policy issues before the court
required it to examine the evidence relating to the claims. 84 There-

after, the Illinois Supreme Court granted the defendant leave to
appeal. The primary issues on appeal were: whether comparative
negligence or fault applies to strict products liability actions and
whether joint and several liability survives comparative negligence. 85 In a thoughtful opinion, the supreme court held that

250.22; Appel & Michael, supra note 45, at 186-88. For an excellent discussion of the scope
of the problem, see Casey, The RelationshipBetween ProductsLiability and Workers' Compensation-Third Party Rights Against Negligent Employers, 1981 FEDN INS. COUNSEL
23. See generally Adler, supra note 44, at 21-22; Note, Various Risk Allocation Schemes
Under the Model Uniform Product Liability Act: An Analysis of the Statute of Repose,
ComparativeFault Principles and the ConflictingSocial PoliciesArising from Workplace
Product Injuries,48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 588, 607 (1980).
82. Brief for Appellant at 10. Plantiff asserted that the only defenses based on decedent's conduct available to the defendant manufacturer in a strict products liability
action were assumption of risk or misuse. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
Moreover, plaintiff claimed that comparative negligence affected the determination of
fault between plaintiff and defendant but did not change the fundamental tort doctrine of
joint and several liability of defendants. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
83. No. 56306, slip op. at 1. The trial court certified three questions for interlocutory
appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308. ILL REv. SWAT. ch. 110A,
308 (1981).
Defendant appealed the order to strike both affirmative defenses asserting that the doctrine of comparative negligence as espoused by Alvis v. Ribar required that liability be
based on the degree of fault attributable to each party. Brief for Appellant at 10. See
Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 102 Ill. App. 3d 1205, 434 N.E.2d 1205 (1981) (unpublished
opinion at 1), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, No. 56306 (Ill. Sup. Ct. May 18, 1983). See also
supra note 73 for the specific language in Alvis which defendant contended limited its
liability to proportionate fault.
84. Coney, 102 Ill. App. 3d 1205, 434 N.E.2d 1205 (unpublished opinion at 2). The court
agreed with the plaintiff that the policy issues should be decided "in light of the record,
rather than in a vacuum." Id.
85. The actual issues certified for appeal were as follows:
Whether the doctirne of comparative negligence or fault is applicable to
actions of claims seeking recovery under products liability or strict liability in
tort theories?
Whether the doctrine of comparative negligence or fault eliminates joint and
several liability?
Whether the retention of joint and several liability in a system of comparative
negligence or fault denies defendants equal protection of the laws in violation of
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1 and Ill. Const. 1970, § 2 as to causes of action
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comparative fault does apply to strict products liability and does
not eliminate joint and several liability. 86 The reasoning of the
court reflects the policy considerations the court weighed in
arriving at these answers.

Reasoning of the Court
In deciding the first issue presented, the supreme court went
beyond the issue of the applicability of comparative fault to strict
products liability and determined which aspects of the decedent's
misconduct would be treated as damage-reducing factors.8 7 The
Illinois court initially reviewed the imposition of strict products
liability in Suvada v. White Motor Co. 88 After quoting the public
policy rationale articulated in Suvada, the court pointed out that
manufacturers were not absolute insurers of defective products,
that a plaintiff had specific proof requirements, and that defenses
based on the user's conduct existed.8 9 The court then noted that
public policy demanded the adoption of comparative negligence
in Alvis v. Ribar to more equitably allocate the loss in negligence
actions. 90 The court summarized the impact of comparative negligence upon strict products liability in other jurisdictions, commenting that the majority of jurisdictions have applied comparative negligence principles to strict products liability. 91
Further, the court declared that the application of comparative
fault principles would not frustrate the fundamental policy goals
announced in Suvada.9 2 Strict products liability would still

arising on or before March 1, 1978. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, § 301 et seq.)?
No. 56306, slip op. at 1.
Id. at 8, 13. In resolving the third issue, the Coney court decided that retaining
86.
joint and several liability in a system of comparative fault does not deny the defendants
equal protection of the laws. Id. at 14-15. The court stated that defendant could not
attempt to circumvent the prospective ruling of Skinner by the equal protection argument. Id. at 14. Moreover, the court questioned the defendant's standing to raise the
constitutional issue because the defendant had not filed a third-party claim and, therefore, was the only defendant in the suit. Id.
87. Id. at 9.
88. Id. at 2. See 32 Ill. 2d at 618-19, 210 N.E.2d at 186.
89. Id. at 2-3.
90. Id. at 3.
91. Id. at 3-5. While the court in Coney distinguished the cases which did not apply
comparative negligence to strict products liability, the court did not include Connnecticut
as a comparative jurisdiction. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572o(a) (West Supp. 1982).
92. No. 56306, slip op. at 6.
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relieve the problems encountered by the plaintiff in proving negligence or breach of warranty for injuries received from defective
products.9 3 The court also explained that, with comparative negligence, the plaintiff bears only the risk of loss caused by his
fault; the manufacturer spreads the remaining loss among all
94
consumers and users of defective products.
Recognizing the theoretical difficulty of comparing the plaintiffs conduct (a fault concept) with the defendant's product (a
no-fault concept), the court reasoned that the basis for comparison was the causative contribution of each to the injury. 9 5 The
court noted the reliance on comparative causation in other jurisdictions and quoted with approval the language of Skinner
which focused on causation factors to apportion damages for
contribution purposes. 96 The court paraphrased the language of
Skinner, stating that the damages for plaintiffs injuries would
be apportioned "on the basis of the relative degree to which the
defective product and plaintiff's conduct proximately caused
97
them."
To implement the comparative fault defense, the court reevaluated the applicability of the prior defenses to strict products liability. Instead of completely barring a plaintiffs recovery, the
court announced that a plaintiffs assumption of the risk or misuse would proportionately reduce his recovery. 98 However, contributory negligence such as a plaintiffs failure to inspect, discover or guard against a product defect, would not be a damagereducing factor. 9 9 The court held that after the defendant's

93. Id. The court's analysis followed the reasoning of Daly v. General Motors Corp.,
20 Cal. 3d 725, 736-37, 575 P.2d 1162, 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386 (1978).
94. No. 56306, slip op. at 6. See Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp.
740, 753-54 (D. Kan. 1978); Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 737, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
95. No. 56306, slip op. at 7-8.
96. Id. at 8. In addition to those cited by the court in Coney, the following cases have
expressed approval of the comparative causation analysis: Pan-Alaskan Fisheries, Inc. v.
Maine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1139 (9th Cir. 1977) (admiralty law); Stueve v.
American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 760 (D. Kan. 1978); Sun-Valley Airlines,
Inc., v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 602 (D. Idaho 1976); Scott v. Rizzo, 96
N.M. 682, 688, 634 P.2d 1234, 1240 (1981); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d
344, 352 (Tex. 1977).
97. No. 56306, slip op. at 8.
98. Id. at 9.
99. Id. The court quoted with approval the language of Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co.,
45 Ill. 2d 418, 423, 261 N.E.2d 305, 308 (1970), which had substantially adopted the Restatement § 402A, comment n defenses to strict products liability. See supra notes 33-35.
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liability is established, and where the plaintiffs misconduct
causes the injury, the plaintiffs damages will be proportionately
reduced by his fault.100
In deciding the second issue, whether the adoption of comparative negligence eliminates joint and several liability, the court
discussed the treatment of the issue in other jurisdictions.
Observing that the majority of jurisdictions retain joint and several liability after comparative negligence, the court summarized
the four primary rationales for retaining joint and several liability: (1) an indivisible injury is not made divisible because fault is
capable of apportionment-a concurrent tortfeasor is still responsible for the entire indivisible injury proximately caused by his
negligence; (2) the plaintiff should not have to bear the burden of
loss caused by an insolvent or immune tortfeasor; (3) the plaintiff is not a tortfeasor-the plaintiff has the duty to protect his
own safety, whereas the defendant has the duty to act with care
for the safety of others; and (4) injured plaintiffs need to obtain
adequate compensation for their injuries. 10 1
Relying on the policy goals and language of Alvis, the court
asserted that comparative negligence requires that the plaintiffs
damages be reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to
him. 10 2 The plaintiffs damages should not be further reduced by
the percentage of fault caused by an insolvent or an immune
tortfeasor. 0 3 The court also found support in the legislative
enactment of the Skinner contribution doctrine to retain joint
and several liability. 10 4 Under the statute, the defendant continues to bear the burden of the insolvent or immune tortfeasor.
The court maintained that Alvis did not require that the defendant be liable for only the portion of damages produced by his
fault.1 05

100. No. 56306, slip op. at 9.
101. Id. at 10-11. The court followed the reasoning of American Motorcycle Ass'n v.
Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 588-90, 578 P.2d 899, 905-06, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 188-89
(1978).
102. No. 56306, slip op. at 12.

103.

Id.

104.
105.

Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 13.
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ANALYSIS

The Application of ComparativeNegligence to
Strict Products Liability
1. Policy Considerations
In applying comparative negligence principles to strict products liability, the Illinois Supreme Court attempted to balance
the competing policy considerations of each doctrine. The policy
goals of strict products liability previously articulated by the
court were consumer protection, risk distribution and safety
incentive.1 0 6 The overriding policy reason for adopting comparative negligence was fairness to the litigants. 10 7 The Coney court
did not address the products liability goals of consumer protection and safety incentive. Neither goal would be advanced by the
application of comparative negligence principles. 0 8 Instead, the
court focused on relieving the plaintiff's proof problems and risk
distribution as the major reasons for imposing strict products
liabilty. 10 9 It explained that reducing the plaintiff's recovery
through comparative negligence would not affect the plaintiff's

106. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 69, 73.
108. See Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155, 160-61 (S.D. 1979); Daly v. General Motors
Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 757, 575 P.2d 1162, 1181, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 399 (1978) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting); Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 24-26, 374
N.E.2d 437, 448-49 (1977) (Dooley, J., dissenting).
For the view that the application of comparative negligence principles does not promote the public policy of consumer protection, see Note, supra note 69, at 622-27; Note,
Comparative Faultand Strict Products Liability: Are They Compatible?5 PEPPERDINE L.
REv. 501, 513-14 (1978). For a discussion of the lessening of the safety incentive after
comparative negligence, see Seidelson, The 402A Defendant and the Negligent Actor, 15
DUQ. L. REv. 371, 375 (1977); Westra, supra note 28, at 363. Contra Sales, supra note 34, at
771-72 (safety incentive remains because user may be blameless); Note, surpa note 81, at
607 (safety incentive is part of the user's responsibility). See generally Twerski, The Use
and Abuse of ComparativeNegligence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. REv. 797, 798-802
(1977) (suggesting that applying comparative negligence in all product liability actions,
regardless of the type of defect litigated, would significantly reduce the manufacturer's
responsibility to the public).
109. No. 56306, slip op. at 6. See Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc.
55 P.2d 42, 45-46 (Alaska 1976); Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 737-39, 575 P.2d at 1168-69, 144 Cal.
Rptr. at 386-87. Many commentators have asserted that applying comparative negligence
to strict products liability would advance the goal of risk distribution. See Fischer, supra
note 27, at 433; Plant, ComparativeNegligence and Strict Tort Liability, 40 LA. L. REV.
403, 415 (1980); Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiffs Fault-The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. REv. 373, 378-79 (1978); Comment, ProductLiability Reform
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proof requirements and would further the goal of risk distribution. 110
Although the Coney court downplayed the goals of consumer
protection and safety incentive, it correctly decided that the language and policy goals of Alvis demanded the priority of risk
distribution. In Alvis, the court had held the defendant liable for
all of the plaintiffs damages not caused by the fault of the plaintiff."' By holding the product user or consumer responsible for
his own culpable conduct, the Coney court allocated the risk to
the party who created that portion of the risk. After Coney, the
injured consumer or user will be protected and compensated, but
only to the extent of damage not attributable to his misconduct. 12 The Alvis goal of fairness to the litigants required that
the plaintiff assume the economic loss caused by his fault rather
than place the total loss on the manufacturer and eventually
other consumers." 3 In Coney, the court concluded that apportioning damages in a strict products liability suit more equitably
allocated the loss if both plaintiffs conduct and defendant's product caused the injury. 114

Proposalsin Washington-A Public Policy Analysis, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 143, 159
(1980). For an explanation of the theory of alleviating plaintiffs proof problems, see Noel,
supra note 34, at 110.
110. No. 56306, slip op. at 6.
111. 85 Ill. 2d at 25, 27-28, 421 N.E.2d at 897-98.
112. See, e.g., No. 56306, slip op. at 6.
113. Id. With the application of comparative principles the manufacturer spreads the
risk of loss to other consumers, but not the loss caused by an injured consumer's own
failure to protect himself. See Fischer, supra note 27, at 447; Wade, supra note 109, at 379.
114. The decision in Coney follows the recommendations of the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, §§ 1, 2, reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOT. 36 (Supp. 1981) [hereinafter
cited as UCFA], and the Model Uniform Product Liability Act, § 111, 44 FED. REG. 6273436 (Oct. 31, 1979) [hereinafter cited as UPLA], which advocate applying comparative
fault principles to strict products liability. See 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABiLITy § 12A.01(3), at 378 (1979); V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, § 21.4, at 168 (Supp.
1981), H. WOODS, supra note 10, § 22:1, at 411-12; Sales, supra note 34, at 774-76; Comment, supra note 109, at 157-58.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Comparative Fault Act in 1977 to suggest a comprehensive plan to equitably apportion losses based on comparative fault principles. Wade, supra note 109, at 373-74, 392401. The Department of Commerce Task Force on Products Liability proposed the Model
Uniform Products Liability Acts in response to the perceived products liability crisis that
caused rising costs and insurance premiums and disincentives for the development and
manufacturing of new products. UPLA, supra, § 101, 44 FED. REG. 62713-15. See generally Schwartz, Uniform Product Liability Act-A Brief Overview, 33 VAND. L REv. 579
(1980); Executive Summary for the Final Report of the Federal Interagency Task Force
on Product Liabiltiy, 1977 INS. LJ. 686; Note, supra note 81, at 588-93, 605-07. But see
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2. Basis For Comparison
The decision in Coney reaffirmed the conceptual distinction
between negligence and strict products liability causes of action
in Illinois. While recognizing that this "apples and oranges"
comparison between the plaintiff's conduct and the defendant's
product may be more theoretical than practical, the court maintained the conceptual distinction by using comparative causation as the basis for comparison. 1' 5 With comparative causation,
courts apportion damages by comparing the parties' causal contribution to plaintiffs injury, irrespective of fault. 116 This comparative analysis shifts the focus from weighing the fault of the
parties to measuring and comparing causative factors and avoids
17
the semantic difficulties of the comparative fault analysis."
However, this approach creates other problems in administering
a system of comparative fault.
There has been extended legal debate concerning the problems
in applying comparative negligence principles to strict products
liability and the appropriate basis for comparison."18 Although
courts and juries have been able to make the comparison between
plaintiffs conduct and defendant's product, legal authorities
have been unable to resolve the controversy. 119 Whether the

Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law-A Rush to
Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221, 223-24 (1979) (the proposed UPLA was a premature
response to a questionable crisis).
115. No. 56036, slip op. at 8. See Doyle v. Rhodes, 109 Ill. App. 3d 590, 595, 440 N.E.2d
895,897-98 (1982).
116. Sun-Valley Airlines, Inc., v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 603-04 (D.
Idaho 1976); Thibault v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 809, 395 A.2d 843,850 (1978).

See Guy, supra note 47, at 485; Jensvold, supra note 28, at 725. See generally Twerski,
The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry into the Emerging Doctrineof Comparative Cau
sation, 29 MERCER L. REV. 403, 411-13 (1978).
117. Rizzo & Arnold, CausalApportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1402-05 (1980). Courts in other jurisdictions developed comparative causation in response to the need for a pure theoretical basis for comparing
strict products liability and negligence. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d
149, 159-60 (3d Cir. 1979).
118. See Sales, supra note 34, at 761. For an excellent discussion of the scope of the
problem, see Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors, 292 Or. 590, 595-607, 642 P.2d 624
628-35 (1982).
119. For the commentators favoring application of comparative negligence, see
Fischer, supra note 27, at 432-33 n.11. Those commentators opposed to applying comparative negligence to strict products liability include: Levine, Strict Products Liability and
ComparativeNegligence: The Collision of Faultand No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337,
346 (1977) (no basis of comparison between plaintiff conduct and defective product); Westra, supra note 28, at 150-55 (restructure defenses rather than apply comparative princi-
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problem is merely semantic or conceptually significant, courts
and commentators have struggled to bridge the gap between
fault and no-fault theories of recovery to determine shares of liability. 120 Besides comparative causation, courts in other jurisdictions have developed four principle methods to apportion damages between a negligent plaintiff and a strictly liable defendant:
negligence per se, quasi-fault comparison, comparative fault and
damage reduction. 121 While the court in Coney did not adopt any
of the alternative methods, comparative causation does not completely solve the problems encountered in equitably allocating
damages in products liability actions.
Although comparative causation conquers the conceptual
problem, there are practical disadvantages to this method of

ples); Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-RethinkingProducts Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 297, 343-48 (1977) (limited application depending on
plaintiffs interaction with the product and on the definition of defect). See generally 2 J.
DOOLEY, supra note 18, § 32.87, at 130-31 (Supp. 1982); V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10,
§§ 12.1-12.7, at 200-10; H. WOODS, supra note 10, §§ 14:42-14:50, at 312-30; Annot., 9 A.L.R.
4TH 633 (1982).
120. See, e.g., Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 735-37, 575 P.2d at 1167-68, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86;
Thibault, 118 N.H. at 809-12, 395 A.2d at 848-50. Cf. Butaud, 55 P.2d at 45 (applying
comparative principles to strict products liability creates some conceptual problems but
they are more apparent than real).
121. Negligence per se operates with a comparative negligence statute to treat strict
products liability as negligence per se or a violation of statute. See, e.g., Dippel v. Sciano,
37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63-64 (1967). See also V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10,
§ 12.6, at 205-06. Quasi-fault characterizes the manufacture or sale of a defective product
as social or legal fault which is then compared to plaintiffs fault. See, e.g., Butaud, 555
P.2d at 44. See also Fleming, supra note 72, at 270; Wade, supra note 109, at 377. Comparative fault weighs the culpability or fault of the parties without regard to the semantic
difficulties. See, e.g., Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 736-37, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386. See
also Sales, supra note 34, at 776-77.
With damage reduction, plaintiff's conduct is compared to the standard of a reasonable
person using the product. To the extent that the plaintiff deviates from the standard of
care, the damage award is reduced. See Sandford, 292 Or. at 603-06, 642 P.2d at 633-35;
Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 74749, 575 P.2d at 1176-77, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 394-95 (Clark, J., concurring); Fischer, supra note 27, at 449. This method avoids the fault-weighing dilemma of
comparative fault through use of the "fault line" concept as articulated in Wing v. Morse,
300 A.2d 495, 500 (Me. 1973). In determining fault, or the deviation from the standard of a
reasonable person, culpable conduct is placed on a spectrum with no fault, then inadvertence at one end and intentional wrong-doing at the other. The factfinder calculates the
relative culpability of the parties by establishing their position on the fault line. Id. See
Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative Fault Laws-An Analysis of the
Alternatives, 40 LA. L. REV. 346, 348-49 (1980). For a complete overview of the various
approaches and a survey of the jurisdictions applying comparative fault principles to
strict products liability, see generally Carestia, The Interaction of Comparative Negligence and Strict ProductsLiability-Where Are We? 47 INS. COUNS. 53 (1980).

630

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 14

applying comparative principles to strict products liability. 122
Critics of comparative causation argue that it is difficult to measure causation because there may be many interrelated causes of
the injury. 12 3 It has also been suggested that there is no functional relationship between causation and fault. 124 One party
may be the major cause of the injury, but demonstrate little fault
in terms of culpable conduct. 12 5 Further, several authorities
observe that causation should play a different role in apportioning damages in comparative fault. 126 Initially proximate causation is established, then the fault of the parties is determined for
purposes of comparison. 127 Therefore, causal fault is compared,
not causation.
There are obvious theoretical and practical problems inherent
in any process of apportionment. 128 The major difficulty lies in
the question of what is compared in comparative negligence:
fault, causation, or fault and causation combined. 2 9 Although

122. Sandford, 292 Or. at 597-98, 642 P.2d at 630-31. Professor Twerski has criticized
comparative causation as a judicial "slight of hand" which developed to resolve the
inability to compare fault and no-fault theories of recovery. Twerski, Selective Use of
ComparativeFault,16 TRIAL 30, 32 (1980).
123. Aiken, ProportioningComparative Negligence-Problemsof Theory and Special
Verdict Formulation,53 MARQ. L. REv. 293, 296 (1970); Carestia, supra note 121, at 67;
Fischer, supra note 27, at 445. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 52, at 313-14.
124. Fischer, supra note 27, at 445-46.
125. A frequent example given to demonstrate the distinction between fault and causation for comparative purposes is the hypothetical of the intoxicated motorist. A collision occurs between two motorists, one intoxicated and the other momentarily distracted.
The distracted motorist causes 75% of the damages, but was only slightly at fault. If only
causation is measured, the issue becomes whether the intoxicated motorist, who was
more at fault but caused 25% of the damages, should recover more than the distracted
motorist. See V. SCHWARTZ, supranote 10, § 17.1, at 276; Fischer, supra note 27, at 44546;
Kionka, supra note 27, at 18. Additionally, questions of causation lead to the area of
proximate causation, which is imprecisely defined in terms of foreseeability and legal
responsibility. Carestia, supra note 121, at 66-67. Cf. Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610
F.2d 149, 159 (3d Cir. 1979) (explanation of cause-in-fact and proximate causation).
126. E.g., Fleming, supra note 72, at 249; Prosser, ComparativeNegligence, 51 MICH.
L REv. 465, 481 (1953).
127. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, § 17.1, at 275-76; Fischer, supra note 27, at 438. For
a discussion of the relationship between fault and causation in comparative fault analysis, see H. WOODS, supra note 10, § 5:5, at 108-09. Some scholarly authorities claim that
fault is a qualitative evaluation whereas causation is a quantitative measurement. Aiken,
supra note 123, at 294; Appel & Michael, supra note 45, at 189.
128. See, e.g., Sandford,292 Or. at 595-607, 642 P.2d at 628-35.
129. Id. at 617-23, 642 P.2d at 638-43 (Peterson, J., concurring). For the view that fault
is compared, see State v. Katz, 572 P.2d 775, 777 (Alaska 1977); Pearson, supra note 121,
at 346; Prosser, supra note 126, at 481. For an explanation of the ocmparative causation
approach, see Murray, 610 F.2d at 159-61; Arnold & Rizzo, supra note 117, at 1402-05;
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the authorities have not been able to agree on the precise role of
fault and causation in comparative negligence, both factors are
considered in apportioning damages. 130 In fact, both compara-

tive fault and comparative causation evaluate fault and causation, but in a different order and with different emphasis.' 3 ' The
important consideration is that the comparative process should
allow the court or jury to determine a party's share in the
32
responsibility for damages.
The basis of comparison that makes the most sense, practically and theoretically, is that courts and jurors should weigh
fault and causation in whatever manner appears to be most
fair.' 33 A jury considering only the extent to which fault contributed to the injury and not the seriousness of the blameworthy
conduct is difficult to imagine. 134 By comparing fault and causation, courts would have to sacrifice some doctrinal fault distinc135
tions between negligence and strict products liability actions.

Jensvold, supranote 28, at 741. For the view that both fault and causation are compared,
see Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 162-63, 406 A.2d 140, 146
(1979); J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS, 256-57 (1977) (interpreting English and Australian
law); James, Connecticut's ComparativeNegligence Statute: An Analysis of Some Problems, 6 CONN. L. REv. 207, 216-17 (1973-74). Both the Uniform Comparative Fault Act and
the Model Uniform Products Liability Act compare fault and causation to apportion
damages. UCFA, supra note 114, § 2(b); UPLA, supra note 114; § 111(b)(3). See H.
WOODS, supra note 10, § 22:6, at 417-18.
130. See Twerski, supranote 116, at 413-14.
131. With comparative fault, each party's fault which proximately caused the injury
is compared, and percentages of liability are assigned accordingly. Pan-Alaskan Fisheries, 565 F.2d at 1139. In comparative causation, the culpable conduct and product are
compared in terms of the causal factors contributing to the injury. Thibault, 118 N.H. at
812, 395 A.2d at 850. However, it is first necessary to determine what conduct is included
in the definition of fault. Sun-Valley, 411 F. Supp. at 603 n.5.
132. Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 737, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386. Several courts
have expressed the view that the labels comparative fault and comparative causation are
inconsequential; the semantic distinctions only add more confusion to the application of
comparative principles to strict products liability. See Pan-Alaskan Fisheries,565 F.2d at
1139; Stueve, 457 F. Supp. at 757, 759-60. However, other courts have contended that the
distinction between assigning a percentage figure to a party's degree of fault in contrast
to the degree of causation will make a difference in calculating the proportionate share of
liability. See Thibault, 118 N.H. at 809-12, 395 A.2d at 848-50; Sandford, 624 Or. at 599,
642 P.2d at 632. It has been suggested that the focus on either fault or causation will
affect the language of the jury instructions and counsels' presentation of evidence and
arguments to the court or jury. Id.; Kionka, supra note 12, at 18.
133. Twerski, supra note 116, at 413-14. Measuring fault and causation will most
nearly approximate the common sense approach used by juries to apportion damages.
Kionka, supra note 12 at 18.
134. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, § 17.1, at 276.
135. Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 737, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386. Contra Thibault,
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However, even though the Illinois Supreme Court applied comparative causation to strict products liability in Skinner and
Coney, the court took fault into account because it measured the
culpability of the blameworthy parties.
In Skinner, the court required more culpability than negligence on the part of the defendant employer before permitting
the strictly liable manufacturer to seek contribution. 136 Before
the causal contribution to the injury could be considered, fault
had to reach a certain level. 137 Moreover, the statutory codification of Skinner allows contribution from parties "subject to liability in tort" and determines liability on the basis of "relative
culpability." 138 Both the Skinner decision and the contribution
act, therefore, partially apportioned damages on the basis of relative fault.
In Coney, the court applied the Skinner comparative causation
analysis to strict products liability, but the court again evaluated
fault by defining the plaintiffs misconduct which was included
in the comparative fault defense. 13 9 The court took fault into
account by rejecting plaintiff's unobservant, awkward, ignorant
or inattentive behavior as a defense. 140 Only more culpable user
conduct was permitted as a damage-reducing factor.141 The court
followed the Alvis "fault" reasoning as well as the Skinner "causation" reasoning. The court held that after defendant's liability
is established, and where both defendant's product and plaintiffs misconduct cause the damages, plaintiffs recovery would
be reduced by the "amount which the trier of fact finds him at
fault."' 4 2 Therefore, the court in Coney interjected fault into the

118 N.H. at 811, 395 A.2d at 849 (semantic and conceptual clarity is crucial in the comparative process).
136. See supra notes 57-58.
137. Applying the reasoning of Williams, the Skinner court required the employer to
assume the risk or misuse the product before permitting the manufacturer's claim for
contribution. 70 Ill. 2d at 16, 374 N.E.2d at 443. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36,
57-59.
138. Contribution Act, supra note 63, §§ 2(a), 3.
139. No. 56306, slip op. at 8-9.
140. Id. at 9. See infra text accompanying notes 155-57.
141. The Illinois Supreme Court declared that both misuse and assumption of risk
could be compared in the apportionment of damages. Id. This approach evolved from the
Restatement defenses adopted in Williams, 45 Ill. 2d at 423, 261 N.E.2d at 308. See supra
note 35.
142. No. 56306, slip op. at 9. If the court in Coney had intended to apply a pure comparative causation analysis, it should have reduced the damage award "in proportion to
the plaintiffs causal contribution to his own injury." Murray, 610 F.2d at 162. Cf. Thi-
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comparative causation analysis. Although the emphasis was
placed on causal factors in both Skinner and Coney, in effect
fault and causation were compared.
The comparative causation approach in Coney somewhat
modified the comparative fault doctrine espoused in Alvis. In
Alvis, the court emphasized the comparative fault basis for
apportioning damages in negligence actions. 143 However, the
comparative basis in Coney is compatible with the Alvis doctrine because both fault and causation enter into the comparison. 144 If Coney shifted the Alvis comparative fault approach to
comparative causation, Illinois courts must decide whether they
want to distinguish between the comparative basis for negligence and strict products liability actions. Perhaps the analytical shift in Coney was in emphasis only and thus the trier of fact
should compare fault and causation to apportion damages in all
comparable tort actions.
Comparative causation is an appropriate method of allocating
damages in Illinois if the courts realize that fault should also be
taken into account in calculating the proportionate shares of liability. Both fault and causation are legal conclusions; both should
be used by juries and courts to determine responsibility for
damages.1 45 Illinois courts should not rigidly follow the doctrine
of comparative causation without considering fault in applying
comparative principles to strict products liability. The jury
instructions should reflect the fact that both fault and causation
be compared in apportioning liability for damages.
3. Defenses to Strict Products Liability
In Coney the Illinois Supreme Court applied the defense of
comparative fault to strict products liability. 46 The court did not
include the plaintiff's failure to inspect, discover or guard against
a product defect within the definition of comparative fault; however, it did declare that the plaintiffs assumption of the risk or

bault, 118 N.H. at 812,395 A.2d at 850 (the amount of damages should be reduced by the
"percentage that the plaintiff's misconduct contributed to cause his loss or injury").
143. See supra notes 72-73.
144. No. 56306, slip op. at 8-9. See supra text accompanying notes 13942.
145. See Aiken, supra note 123, at 294-95. See also supra text accompanying notes

133-35.
146.

No. 56306, slip op. at 8.
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misuse would be damage-reducing factors. 147 By restricting the
type of user conduct which could be characterized as fault for
comparative purposes, the court partially maintained the defenses
established by the Second Restatement of Torts, section 402A,
comment "n".148 The court also harmonized the goals of strict
products liability and comparative negligence in defining the
1 49
comparative fault defense.
The Restatement defenses to strict products liability evolved
from the all-or-nothing rule of contributory negligence. 150 The
problem with the old vocabulary of defenses was that plaintiffs
conduct did not always fit into the convenient categories of contributory negligence, assumption of risk and misuse.15 1 In dis-

147. See supra text accompanying note 140. In Coney, the first affirmative defense
stated:
1. That plaintiffs decedent, Clifford M. Jasper, was guilty of negligence or fault
in that he:
a) applied hydraulic pressure to such an extent that rear wheels of the lift
were caused to raise from the floor;
b) failed to keep a proper lookout for structural components of the building
while operating the lift;
c) failed to properly monitor the build-up of hydraulic pressure;
d) failed to gradually reduce hydraulic pressure upon appreciation of the position of the wheels of the lift;
e) removed the support for the "bucket" at a time when the wheels of the lift
were raised; and
f) failed to follow instructions and directions for elimination of risk.
Brief for Appellant at 7-8.
Although it is unclear from the pleadings, plaintiffs decedent was not alleged to have
assumed the risk or misused the product. The issue of whether the defense of comparative
fault includes assumption of risk and misuse was not an issue before the court. See supra
note 85. See, e.g., Murray, 610 F.2d at 162. However, the defendant raised the possibility
of the anomalous situation where plaintiffs assumption of the risk would bar his recovery in strict products liability actions but reduce his award in negligence actions. No.
56306, slip op. at 3. See supra note 35. See also Kionka, supra note 12, at 22. This anomaly has been noted in other jurisdictions because products liability actions are often
alternatively pleaded in negligence and breach of warranty counts. Stueve, 457 F. Supp.
at 751; Butaud, 555 P.2d at 45; Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 738, 575 P.2d at 1169-70, 144 Cal. Rptr.
at 387-88. See Sales, supra note 34, at 756-57.
148. The court in Coney left intact the Restatement's position that consumer reliance
behavior was not a defense to strict products liability. Restatement 402A, supra note 22,
at comment n. See Busch v. Busch Constr. Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 394 (Minn. 1977); Note,
supra note 34, at 240.
149. By excluding reliance behavior from the comparative fault defense, the court
advanced the risk distribution policy goal. See infra text accompanying notes 156-59.
150. Nielson, supra note 36, at 193; Noel, supra note 34, at 118; Westra, supra note 28,
at 379. See supranotes 37, 39.
151. Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 741-42, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390; Note, supra
note 34, at 240-46.
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tinguishing the types of plaintiffs conduct, the parties had to
label the user's conduct as either objective negligence, subjective
assumption of risk or unforeseeable misuse. 15 2 If the plaintiff
were negligent, he would recover totally; if he had assumed the
153
risk or misused the product, he would recover nothing.
While the old system of defenses produced inequitable results,
the classification of all user's conduct in causing the injury as
fault is also unjust. 5 4 In a design defect or failure to warn cause
of action where lack of safety devices is alleged as the defect,

152. For a discussion of the mutable traditional defenses to strict products liability,
see Epstein, supra note 34, at 268-70 (disparate definitions of contributory negligence
cause significant differences in recovery); Sales, supra note 34, at 755-59 (both assumption of risk and misuse overlap with contributory negligence). Cf. Westra, supra note 28,
at 364-73 (courts used the traditional defenses to insure plaintiffs recovery).
153. No. 56306, slip op. at 2-3. See, e.g., Pan-Alaskan Fisheries,565 F.2d at 1139-49.
See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
154. Twerski, supra note 108, at 807-08. Contra Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 74142, 575 P.2d at
1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (integrating all plaintiffs conduct into the comparative fault
defense equitably apportions damages).
The majority of commentators suggest that the comparative fault defense should
include all types of plaintiffs conduct that contributed to his injury. V. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 10, § 12.7, at 207-7; Carestia, supra note 121, at 68-70; Wade, supra note 109, at 379.
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act and the Model Uniform Product Liability Act, however, differ with respect to the treatment of plaintiffs failure to discover the product
defect or to guard against the possibility of its existence. The Uniform Comparative Fault
Act defines fault to include plaintiffs contributory negligence, reckless conduct, unreasonable assumption of risk, misuse and unreasonable failure to avoid injury. UCFA, supra
note 114, § 1(b). The Model Uniform Product Liability Act provides that the plaintiff's
failure to inspect for product defects will not reduce his damages. UPLA, supranote 114,
§ 112(A)(1). Both misuse and assumption of the risk will subject the claimant to damage
apportionment. Id. §§ 112(C)(1), 112(BX1). The Model Product Act, therefore, is more restrictive in the type of behavior that will reduce plaintiff's damages. See Sales, supra note
34, at 775-76.
In addition to Illinois, the following jurisdictions do not include plaintiff's failure to
discover the defect within the comparative fault defense: West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
366 So. 2d 80, 92 (Fla. 1976); Tulkku v. Mackworth Rees, Div. of Avis Indus., Inc., 406
Mich. 615,620, 281 N.W.2d 291,294 (1979), on remand, 101 Mich. App. 709, 301 N.W.2d 46
(1980); Busch v. Busch Constr. Co., 262 N.W.2d 377, 394 (Minn. 1977); Thibault v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 812, 395 A.2d 843, 849 (1978); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry
& Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 160, 406 A.2d 140, 144 (1979); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 690,
634 P.2d 1234, 1240 (1981) (dictum); Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors, 292 Or.
590, 607, 642 P.2d 624, 635 (1982). See generally H. WOODS, supra note 10, §§ 14:45, 14:46,
at 319-24 (Supp. 1982).
The defenses to strict products liability based on plaintiffs conduct under a system of
comparative negligence comprise a confusing body of case law. For an explanation of the
various approaches, see V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, §§ 12.2-12.6, at 196-207; H. WOODS,
supra note 10, §§ 14:33-14:50, at 296-328. For the status of assumption of risk, see L
FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 114, § 12A.02[2], 378-380.2, at 122-29 (Supp. 1982);
Annot, 16 A.L.R. 4TH 700 (1982).
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plaintiffs behavior in using the product may be built into the
product and, therefore, not constitute fault. 155 This situation,
which includes the plaintiffs failure to discover the defect or
guard against the possibility of its existence, poses the issue of
"reliance" behavior which was an initial reason for imposing
strict products liability.156 In this reliance situation, the risk
created is due to the defective product, rather than the plaintiffs
conduct. The consumer or user has been lulled by the packaging
of the product and by the manufacturer's assurances that the
product is safe.15 7 Under these circumstances, the plaintiff should
not have to assume the responsiblity for the risk of injury to
which the manufacturer exposed him. 58 Similarly, with foreseeable misuse, the manufacturer should have reasonably anticipated that the product would be used in a particular manner and
protected against that use with safety or warning devices. 59
Consistent with the strict products liability and comparative
fault goals of allocating the risk to those who created the risk,
the decision in Coney correctly distinguishes reliance behavior
from fault. The plaintiff will not be held responsible for the risk
created by the manufacturer. If plaintiffs misconduct contributed to his injury and it was not the reliance behavior, then it
would be defined as fault by the trier of fact and will proportionately reduce plaintiffs recovery. 60
By characterizing all plaintiffs conduct as fault except the
reliance behavior, however, the court did not simplify the court
or jury's task. The court merely shifted the battleground from
labeling plaintiffs behavior as contributory negligence, assumption of risk or misuse to defining it as comparative fault.161 After

155. Twerski, supra note 119, at 343-48. Cf. Wade, supra note 110, at 382 (the failure to
discover the defective condition must be found to be negligent).
156. Note, supra note 34, at 240. See, e.g., West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d
80, 92 (Fla. 1976).
157. Epstein, supra note 34, at 284. The consumer reliance theory and resulting obligation of the manufacturer was first expressed in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24
Cal. 2d 453, 467, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
158. West, 336 So. 2d at 92.
159. Palmer v. Avco Distrib. Corp., 82 Ill. 2d 211, 219, 412 N.E.2d 959, 964 (1980). See
Kiselis, supra note 32, at 230-35.
160. No. 56306, slip op. at 9. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire coined the phrase
"plaintiffs misconduct" to replace contributory negligence in the jury charge and to describe accurately the behavior of the plaintiff which caused the injury. Thibault, 118 N.H.
at 811,395 A.2d at 849.
161. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 34, at 177 (including all the old defenses in the definition of fault makes it unnecessary to draw difficult distinctions between types of plain-
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Coney, the plaintiff will try to categorize his behavior as inadvertent, awkward, inattentive or totally dependent on the defective product. 16 2 Defendant will attempt to classify the plaintiffs
behavior as objectively negligent (falling below the reasonable
standard of care), reckless, adventuresome or use of the product
after the discovery of the defect. 163 Although fault and reliance
behavior may be difficult to distinguish, this approach has the
beneficial effect of forcing the factfinder to consider both fault
and causation in apportioning damages.' 64 Moreover the fineline distinctions between fault and reliance behavior are necessary to preserve the risk distribution policies of strict products
liabilty and comparative fault. 65 Therefore, the advantages of
this fault-weighing process outweigh the difficulty in distinguishing the reliance behavior. The jury instructions should reflect the
fact that the plaintiff has the right to rely on product safety and
that inadvertent failure to inspect does not constitute fault. 66
In Coney, the Illinois Supreme Court also changed the definition of contributory negligence as applied to strict products liability. Previously, the court had defined contributory negligence
as the lack of due care for one's own safety, objectively measured
by the reasonable person standard. 167 Failure to discover or
guard against a product defect was included within that definition. 168 Now that the court has implemented the comparative
fault defense, contributory negligence in the objective "lack of
due care" sense is treated as fault and will be a damage-reducing
factor.' 69 It is only the reliance type of contributory negligence
which is not considered as fault and will not be causally com-

tiffs conduct).
162. No. 56306, slip op. at 9.
163. See, e.g., UPLA, supra note 114, §§ 112(A)(2), (B)(1), (C)(1)-(2) (describing the conduct which will proportionately reduce claimant's damages).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 139-42.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 156-59. It can be argued that the exclusion of
reliance behavior from fault furthers the strict products liability goal of consumer protec-

tion. See, e.g., Busch, 262 N.W.2d at 394 (the comparative fault defense "must be tailored
to protect the consumer's reliance on the product safety").
166. Note, supra note 24, at 251.
167. Williams, 45 Ill. 2d at 425, 261 N.E.2d at 309.
168. Id. at 423-24, 261 N.E.2d at 308-09. The court in Coney quoted the language from
Williams which distinguished the narrow interpretation of contributory negligence by the
appellate court.
169. See, e.g., West, 336 So. 2d at 90, 92. In Williams, the court had recognized that
contributory negligence included behavior other than failure to inspect or guard against
a product defect. 45 Ill. 2d at 423-25, 261 N.E.2d at 308-10. A plaintiff can be unaware of
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pared to the manufacturer's product. 170 Therefore, contributory
negligence is more narrowly defined in strict products liability
actions after Coney.
Finally, the application of the comparative fault defenses in
Coney should resolve the comparative problem that existed in
apportioning damages for contribution after Skinner. In Skinner,
the court required the strictly liable defendant to allege assumption of the risk or misuse on the part of the third-party defendant
to state a claim for contribution. 17 1 The statutory codification of
Skinner allowed contribution between parties subject to liability in tort for the same injury. 172 It has not been determined
whether contribution is permitted between a strictly liable defendant and a negligent defendant. 173 Illinois courts should apply
the reasoning in Coney and allow contribution between strictly
liable and negligent defendants. Damages should be apportioned
unless the defendant's negligence constituted the reliance type of

the defective condition of the product, yet still fail to act with the care of an ordinary
reasonably prudent person or with reckless disregard of his own safety. See UPLA, supra
note 114, § 112(AX2); Note, supra note 34, at 241 (suggesting that this type of contributory fault be designated as "active user" negligence). This objective contributory negligence is distinguished from assumption of risk which is the voluntary and unreasonable
use of a product with a known defect. Kionka, supranote 12, at 22-23; Kiselis, supra note
32, at 237-41. Nor is this type of conduct included within the definition of misuse because
it does not negate plaintiffs proof of a defective condition or causation. See supra notes
35-37.
Contra Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 160, 406 A.2d 140, 147
(1979) (holding that comparative negligence was applicable to strict products liability but
redefined contributory negligence to include only § 402A, comment n unreasonable
assumption of risk. Neither unforeseeable misuse, objective contributory negligence nor
reliance behavior will operate as damage-reducing factors). See Sales, supra note 34, at
767-68.
170. No. 56306, slip op. at 9. Note, supra note 34, at 251.
171. Skinner, 70 Ill. 2d at 16, 374 N.E.2d at 443. See supra note 57.
172. Contribution Act, supra note 63, § 2(a).
173. The Illinois Appellate Court has interpreted the Contribution Act to allow a
claim for contribution in the following instances: Wirth v. City of Highland, 102 Ill. App.
3d 1074, 1082, 430 N.E.2d 236, 242 (1981) (interspousal immunity does not bar a thirdparty action for contribution); Larson v. Buschkamp, 105 Ill. App. 3d 965, 969-71, 435
N.E.2d 221, 224-2b (1982) (intrafamily immunity does not preclude a claim for contribution against a parent whose child is the plaintiff); Stephens v. McBride, 105 Ill. App. 3d
880, 885, 435 N.E.2d 162, 165 (1982) (failure to give notice under the Local Governmental
and Governmental Employers Tort Immunity Act does not bar a claim for contribution);
Doyle v. Rhodes, 109 Ill. App. 3d 590, 440 N.E.2d 895, 899 (1982) (contribution permitted
between parties whose liability was based on negligence and violation of the Road Construction Industries Act); LeMaster v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 110, Ill. App. 3d 729, 442
N.E.2d 1367, 1371 (1982) (contribution was available to a party found liable under the
Structural Work Act); Morgan v. Kirk Bros., 111 Ill. App. 3d 914, 444 N.E.2d 504, 509
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behavior that was not defined as fault in Coney.174 If a defendant employer reasonably relies on a defendant manufacturer's
product, then the employer is not at fault and should not be liable for a portion of plaintiffs damages. Because the defense of
comparative fault operates within the comparison of fault and
causation established by the court in Coney, the following procedure is suggested to implement the apportionment of damages.
First, the defendant's strict liability is established and a damage
figure is calculated.175 If the plaintiffs conduct is also found to
have contributed to his injury, then the plaintiffs damages will
be proportionately reduced by his relative fault. 176 The court or
jury will determine the degree of plaintiffs fault and the extent
to which that fault caused the injury compared to the defendant's product and its causal contribution to the injury. 177 Even if
plaintiffs reliance behavior contributed significantly to cause
the injury, it will not be compared because that conduct does not
constitute fault. 78 After a percentage figure is obtained, plaintiffs proportionate share of the entire damages will be deducted
from the original damage figure. The policy goals underlying the
Illinois Supreme Court's integration of strict products liability
and comparative negligence will be achieved. The strictly liable
defendant will be held responsible for the loss caused by the
defective product, and the plaintiff will bear the responsibility
79
for the loss resulting from his fault.

(1982) (contribution allowed against party from an alleged violation of the Dram Shop
Act); Erickson v. Gilden, 76 Ill. App. 3d 218, 220, 394 N.E.2d 1076, 1079 (1979) (contribution permitted between negligent joint tortfeasors). For an explanation of the recent
impact of contribution on third-party practice in Illinois, see Kissel, Developments in
Third Party Pratice-Contributionand Indemnity, 71 ILL. B.J. 654 (1983).
174. No. 56306, slip op. at 8-9. See supra notes 155-57.
175. See, e.g., Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 743, 575 P.2d at 1173, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
176. No. 56306, slip op. at 9. See Murray, 610 F.2d at 163; Pan-AlaskanFisheries,565
F.2d at 1139.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 133-35.
178. See supra text accompanying note 160. To facilitate the policy of worker protection, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not permit the defense of contributory negligence
to reduce plaintiff employee's recovery while injured at an "assigned task on a plant
machine" because the employee had no choice in using the unsafe equipment. Suter, 81
N.J. at 167, 406 A.2d at 148. Accord Tulkku, 406 Mich. at 620, 281 N.W.2d at 294.
179. No. 56306, slip op. at 9. In Coney, the court reversed the dismissal of the first
affirmative defense alleging contributory fault on the part of plaintiff's decedent. Id. at
15. Although the defense was pleaded as contributory fault, it may have included charges
that plaintiffs decedent failed to discover or guard against the alleged product defect. See
supra note 147. The court remanded the cause of action to the Circuit Court of Peoria
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Application of ComparativeNegligence to
Joint and Several Liability
In deciding to retain joint and several liability after the adoption of comparative negligence, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the argument that damages are apportioned according to
each party's fault under comparative negligence.180 Although
the court did not address the competing policies of joint and several liabilty and comparative negligence, it implied that the
overriding policy concern in tort actions is compensating injured
plaintiffs. The court stated that comparative negligence only
reduced plaintiffs amount of damages by his fault, not the fault
of any other party causing his injury. 18 ' By announcing that the
risk of an insolvent or immune tortfeasor remains on the defendant, the court ensured that plaintiffs damages would not be
18 2
further reduced after comparative negligence.
The argument that comparative negligence changes the doctrine of joint and several liability is based on the theory that
wrongdoers could not profit from their harmful conduct. 8 3 Joint
and several liabilty ensured that injured, innocent plaintiffs
would be compensated and wrongdoers would be held liable for
their tortious acts. 8 4 Under the system of contributory negligence, the plaintiff who recovered was not a wrongdoer. 8 5 With
the adoption of comparative negligence, the plaintiff must no

County to decide whether plaintiffs decedent was at fault in operating the hydraulic
manlift. No. 56306, slip op. at 15.
180. Id. at 12-13.
181. Paraphrasing the language of Alvis, the court stated that plaintiffs damages
should not be "reduced beyond the percentage of fault attributable to him." Id. at 12
(emphasis in original).
182. Id. at 12-13. Specifically, in Coney, the court affirmed the circuit court's order
striking defendant J.L.G. Industries' second affirmative defense. Id. at 15. The court did
not allow the alleged fault of plaintiffs decedent's employer V. Jobst & Sons, Inc. to be
considered in the computation of damages. For a discussion of the interrelationships
between comparative negligence, joint and several liability, and contribution from an
immune employer, see McNichols, Judicial Elimination of Joint and Several Liability
Because of ComparativeNegligence-A Puzzling Choice, 32 OKLA L. REv. 1, 6-9 (1979);
Pulliam, Comparative Loss Allocation and the Rights and Liabilities of Third Parties
Against an Immune Employer: A Modest Proposal, 1980 FED'N INS. CouN.80, 84-86.
183. Zavos, supranote 44, at 803-04; Comment, ComparativeNegligence in California,
supra note 44, at 776-77.
184. See supranote 54.
185. Adler, supra note 44, at 18; Fleming, supra note 72, at 251; McNichols, supra note
182, at 26; Note, supranote 51, at 349.
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longer be innocent to recover.1 86 After comparative negligence,
the issue becomes whether a wrongdoing plaintiff should receive
full compensation from any defendant, less only the adjustment
1 87
for plaintiffs fault.
Before comparative negligence there was no incentive to divide
plaintiffs injury among all the wrongdoers. 188 In multiple defendant suits, third-party practice allocated the damages among the
defendants but did not divide liability among all the parties. 189
However, if fault can be apportioned between a negligent plaintiff and defendant, then it is argued that the injury is in fact
divisible.190 Those opposed to retaining joint and several liability after comparative negligence contend that the plaintiff should
not have an inherent protected party status.'9 Because the plaintiff may be a wrongdoer, his status is merely the result of being
the first party to sue and, therefore, there is no justification for
imposing entire liability on the defendants. 192

186. Adler, supra note 44, at 14-16; Comment, ComparativeFault and Settlement in
Joint Tortfeasor Cases: A Pleafor Principle Over Policy, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 833, 846-48
(1979); Note,supra note 43, at 754; Note supra note 45, at 1170.
187. Adler, supra note 44, at 14-16. Whether the plaintiff or the defendant should bear
the risk of a joint tortfeasor's insolvency or immunity is significant in an employment
situation such as in Coney. See McNichols, supra note 182, at 12-16; Note, supra note 51,
at 34749; Note, supra note 81, at 608-13.
188. McNichols, supra note 182, at 26; Comment, ComparativeNegligence in California, supra note 44, at 776-77; Note, supra note 43, at 753.
189. See J. DOOLEY, supra note 18, § 26.33, at 576; Note, supra note 56, at 345-52.
Under joint and several liability, the defendants have the burden of apportioning plain-

tiffs damages through the doctrines of third-party practice. See supra note 53. See also
Comment, Comparative Negligence in California,supra note 44, at 776-81; Comment,
supranote 109, at 161. E.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578,
590, 578 P.2d 889, 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 189 (1978) (retaining joint and several liability
after comparative negligence because of the differences in culpability between plaintiffs
and defendants and the indivisibility of plaintiffs injury). But see Adler, supra note 44,
at 14-23 (advocating liability proportionate to fault); Comment, supra note 186, at 833-36,
846-48 (suggesting that fairness demands that joint and several liability be abolished).
190. Adler, supra note 44, at 19; Fleming, supra note 72, at 151; Zavos, supra note 44,
at 788-99; Note, supra note 43, at 753. See Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1074-75
(Okla. 1978) (adopting several liability within a system of proportionate responsibility).
Contra American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 588-89, 578 P.2d at 905, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188
(injuries are not divisible because concurrent tortfeasors are liable for all the injury proximately caused by their negligence); Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91
Wash. 2d 230, 237, 588 P.2d 1308, 1313 (1978) (stating that "the simple feasibility of
apportioning fault .... between plaintiff and defendant, does not render an indivisible
injury 'divisible' for purposes of joint and several liability").
191. Adler, supra note 44, at 14-16; Zavos, supranote 44, at 802-09. See, eqg., Bartlett v.
New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152,646 P.2d 579,583-86 (1982).
192. Adler, supra note 44, at 15-16; Zavos, supra note 44, at 800; Comment, Multiple

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 14

In Coney, the Illinois Supreme Court refuted the "wrongdoing
plaintiff' argument by following the rationale that the plaintiff
is not a tortfeasor. 193 The plaintiff has the duty to protect his
own safety, whereas the defendant has the duty to act with care
for the safety of others. 194 To the extent that the plaintiff does
not act with due care, his recovery should be reduced proportionately. 195 The scope of defendant's duty and resulting liability is
broader because he subjected others to the risk of harm. 196
The court also rejected the argument that apportioning liability for fault makes an indivisible injury "divisible." The court
explained that the feasibility of apportioning fault does not
change the concept of entire liability.1 9 7 A concurrent tortfeasor
is responsible for all the harm proximately caused by his tortious
acts whether or not damages are later apportioned. 198 The court
observed that each defendant whose negligence proximately
caused plaintiffs single, indivisible injury was still liable for the
entire damage award. 199
Parties, supra note 44, at 1273. See Brown v. Keil, 224 Kan. 195, 203, 580 P.2d 867, 874
(1978) (stating that there is "no social policy that should compel defendants to pay more

than their fair share of the loss").
The argument that the labels plaintiff and defendant have lost their significance after
the adoption of comparative negligence, because the plaintiff is the first party to sue, is
not viable in a strict products liability action. The plaintiff is the user or consumer of the

product who is injured. See supra notes 22-25. There is a qualitative difference between
the culpable conduct of the plaintiff and the product of the defendant, and fortuitous
circumstances do not determine who is the plaintiff. But cf. Zavos, supra note 44, at 85-88
(in negligence actions the labels plaintiff and defendant result from fortuitous circumstances rather than qualitative differences in the culpability of the parties).
193. No. 56306, slip op. at 11. See American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 589-90, 578 P.2d
at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189; Seattle FirstNat'l, 91 Wash. 2d at 237, 588 P.2d at 1314. See
also Comment, supra note 186, at 848.
194. No. 56306, slip op. at 11. See supra note 193. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 5,
§ 65, at 416-21.
195. No. 56306, slip op. at 8-9, 12.
196. 20 Cal. 3d at 589-90, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189. The scope of defendant's duty is particularly significant in a products liability action such as in Coney. Strict
products liability evolved to place the risk of loss on the manufacturer who subjected
consumers and users to injury. See supra notes 22-24. Following the policy of risk distribution, the strictly liable manufacturer is more able to spread the loss than the injured,
negligent plaintiff. Therefore, the defendant manufacturer should bear the loss in the
event of an immune, insolvent or absent tortfeasor. Note, supra note 81, at 615 n. 202.
197. No. 56306, slip op. at 11.
198. Id. The court adopted the reasoning of the California Supreme Court expressed in
American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 588-90, 578 P.2d at 905-06, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89. In
American Motorcycle, the court did not equate apportionment of damages based on fault
with division of the injury. Id. For a discussion of the substantive concept of entire
liability, see supra note 44. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).
199. No. 56306, slip op. at 11. See Cornell v. Langland, 109 Ill. App. 3d 472, 440 N.E.2d
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The goals of comparative negligence as articulated in Alvis
were to alleviate the harsh effects of the contributory negligence
rule, to treat litigants fairly and to promote respect for the
law. 20 0 In Coney, the court asserted that eliminating joint and
several liability would not further the Alvis goal of alleviating
harshness on the plaintiff.20 1 The plaintiff, not the defendant,
would bear the loss in the event of an immune, insolvent or
absent tortfeasor. 20 2 In addition, the goals of ensuring fairness
to the litigants and promoting respect for the law do not require
the plaintiff to absorb such a loss. 20 3 The Illinois Supreme Court
decided that it is fair to make the defendant pay for the harm
caused by another tortfeasor who contributed to the injury,
because plaintiffs must be able to obtain adequate compensation. 20 4 The court concluded that the plaintiff did not have to
bear the burden of an insolvent or immune tortfeasor as the price
20 5
for being relieved of the contributory negligence bar to recovery.
In Coney, the Illinois Supreme Court correctly decided that the
doctrine of joint and several liability survives the adoption of
comparative negligence. The argument for abolishing joint and
several liability may be persuasive in some jurisdictions but is
not in Illinois. 20 6 Illinois is one of the few states that allows

985, 988-89 (1982).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
201. No. 56306, slip op. at 12.
202. Id. E.g., McNichols, supra note 182, at 28-31; Note, supra note 51, at 346-47; Comment, ComparativeNegligence in California, supra note 44, at 771. See Brown, 224 Kan.
at 203,580 P.2d at 874; Laubach, 588 P.2d at 1075.
203. Seattle First Nat'l, 91 Wash. 2d at 237, 588 P.2d at 1313; Humphrey, Haas &
Gritzner, Comparative Negligence in Iowa- The Time Has Come for the Iowa Supreme
Court to Put Its House in Order,31 DRAKE L REv. 709, 823-25 (1981-82).
204. No. 56306, slip op. at 12. Other courts and legal authorities have recognized that
the goal of tort law is to fairly compensate individuals for losses. American Motorcycle,
20 Cal. 3d at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189, Seattle First Nat'l, 91 Wash. 2d
at 236, 588 P.2d at 1313-14; W. PROSSER, supranote 5, § 1, at 6.
205. No. 56306, slip op. at 12. See McNichols, supra note 182, at 12; Comment, Multiple
Parties,supra note 44, at 1273; Comment, supra note 109, at 166-67.
206. Critics of joint and several liability have advocated that the common law be
replaced with "several" liability, which would allow damages according to the relative
fault of each of the parties. Adler, supra note 44, at 16-17; Pulliam, supra note 182, at
80-81; Guy, supra note 47, at 489-90. See Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Okla.
1978) (interpreting the comparative negligence statute as mandating several liability).
Other authorities have suggested a second method: several liability should apply only in
those situations where the plaintiff is at fault. McNichols, supra note 182, at 28-31; Pearson, supra note 121, at 363. For a discussion of the states which apply several liability
when the plaintiff is negligent, see Note, supra note 51, at 352-53. Moreover, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma limited the application of its comparative negligence statute as inter-
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comparative contribution between a third-party defendant and
an employer with workers' compensation liability. 2 7 In most
situations, third-party defendants can seek contribution and

preted by Laubach to those situations where the plaintiff was negligent in Boyles v.
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613, 616 (Okla. 1980). Under this modified several
liability theoryi the innocent plaintiff would be entitled to complete recovery, but the
negligent plaintiff would bear the loss caused by an immune tortfeasor.
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act recommends a compromise approach. Under this
system, joint and several liability is retained and damages are assessed against all those
responsible for plaintiffs injury. UCFA, supra note 114, §§ 2(a)(2), 2(c). The Model Uniform Product Liability Act adopts a similar approach but only considers parties to the
action or persons who have been released in determining proportionate shares of liability.
UPLA, supra note 114, §§ 111(BX1)(b), 111(B)(5)-(6). However, if the defendant is unable
to collect the damages that are apportioned to an immune or insolvent tortfeasor within a
year, the plaintiff and other defendants share the portion of damages remaining uncollected. UCFA, supra note 114, § 2(d). In this manner, the plaintiff and defendants reallocate the loss and split the risk of insolvency. McNichols, supra note 182, at 16. The Model
Product Act adopts the reallocation approach of the Fault Act but has a special provision
for the claimant's employer. UPLA, supra note 114, §§ 111(A)(2), 111(BX6). Minnesota
has adopted a variation of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act proposal. MINN. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 604.02 subd. 1-2 (West Supp. 1979). See H. WOODS, supra note 10, §§ 22:5-22:8,
at 417-19.
Other authorities have suggested that the negligent plaintiff and defendants immediately share the uncollected damages according to their proportionate share. Fleming,
supra note 72, at 251-52; Zavos, supra note 44, at 779-83; Note, supra note 45, at 1171.
However, several scholarly authorities have advocated retaining joint and several liability. J. DOOLEY, supra note 18, § 22:8, at 418-19; Humphrey, Haas & Gritzner, supra note
203, at 823-25; Kionka, supra note 12, at 20-21.
In fact, the majority of jurisdictions do not change the doctrine of joint and several
liability after the adoption of comparative negligence. Coney, No. 56306, slip op. at 10-11.
For a partial compilation, see id.; Humphrey, Haas & Gritzner, supra note 203, at 822-23.
See also V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, § 16.4, at 253; H. WOODS, supra note 10, § 13:3, at
225-27. In addition to the jurisdictions listed by the previous sources, Massachusetts and
Montana retain joint and several liability after comparative negligence. MASS GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 231B, §§ 1(b), 3(e) (West Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703 (Supp.
(1982).
Six jurisdictions modify joint and several liability by statute: KAN STAT. ANN. § 6258a(d) (1976) (eliminated); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141(3)(a) (Supp. 1980) (retained unless
plaintiffs negligence is greater than that of defendants); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a
(Supp. 1979) (each defendant liable in proportion to causal negligence); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 18.485 (1979) (retained unless plaintiff's negligence is greater than that of defendants);
TEx. REv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212(a), § 2(c) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (retained unless plaintiffs
negligence is greater than that of defendant); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1035 (Supp. 1981)
(eliminated). For a discussion of the interpretation of the comparative negligence statutes
which modify joint and several liability, see Adler, supra note 44, at 17-19 n. 52; Note,
supra note 51, at 347-49. Only New Mexico has eliminated joint and several liability in
the absence of statute. Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646
P.2d 579, 583-86 (1982).
207. Skinner, 70 111. 2d at 16, 374 N.E.2d at 443; Doyle v. Rhodes, 109 Ill. App. 3d 590,
440 N.E.2d 895, 898 (1982). Only five other states permit the defendant manufacturer to
seek contribution from an employer with statutory liability: California, Minnesota, New
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ultimately pay their proportionate share.2 0 8 This allocation of
damages does not reduce the plaintiffs award and does not
unfairly burden the defendant. 20 9 The Illinois plan for loss
allocation is fair to the litigants and, therefore, furthers the
policy goals of Alvis.
The timing of the accident in Coney precluded the defendant
from taking advantage of the equitable allocation of damages
mandated by Skinner and the contribution statute. 210 Without
the possibility of contribution, J.L.G. Industries, Inc., is not
served by the Illinois system of loss allocation contemplated by
Alvis and Skinner.21 1 Because the employer cannot be made a
third-party defendant and is immune from suit by the decedent

York, North Carolina and Pennsylvania. See Annot., 100 A.L.R. 3D 350, § 4, at 362-65
(1980). Only New York allows contribution in excess of the employer's statutory compensation limits like Illinois. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 154, 282 N.E.2d 288, 295,
331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 391. See H. WOODS, supra note 10, § 13.13, at 245-49, 93-102 (Supp. 1982).
For a discussion of the jurisdictions allowing contribution from the employer, see
Adler, supra note 44, at 21-22. Casey, supra note 81, at 30-34; Mitchell, supra note 81, at
353-54; Pulliam, supra note 182, at 85-86; Weisgall, Product Liability in the Workplace:
The Effect of Workers' Compensation on the Rights and Liabilities of Third Parties,1977
Wis. L. REv. 1035, 1044-45 n. 43, 1082-88.
The UPLA does not permit contribution from the employer, but requires that the
employer pay the entire statutory obligation and reduces plaintiffs recovery from the
defendants by the proportion of the employer's fault. UPLA, supra note 114, §§ 11 1(B)(2),
114. See Note, supranote 81, at 608-18.
208. Kionka, supra note 12, at 20-21. But cf. Note, supra note 58, at 168 n.25, 181-82
(allowing contribution from an employer circumvents the worker's compensation statute).
209. The United States Supreme Court has retained the doctrine of joint and several
liability after comparative negligence and contribution in admiralty law in Edmonds v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 271 (1979). A longshoreman was
injured in the course of his employment and brought a negligence action against the
third-party defendant shipowner. Although the employer was immune from suit because
of statutory liability, the third-party defendant was held liable for all of plaintiffs damages less the 10% negligence of the plaintiff. Id. at 258, 273. The third-party defendant
absorbed the loss caused by the 70% negligence of the employer. The Court reasoned that
Congress intended to place the loss on the third-party defendant shipowner, rather than
the negligent plaintiff. Id. at 270-71.
210. See supra notes 18, 81.
211. In addition to comparative negligence and contribution from an employer, the
Illinois plan for loss allocation includes the other doctrines of third-party practice,
indemnity and equitable apportionment. See supra notes 50-51. See also Kissel, supra
note 173, at 664-66. The liability of one defendant to the plaintiff and to other defendants
is controlled by the interrelating systems which determine the amount of damages paid.
Note, supra note 43, at 750. For a discussion of the allocation of responsibility for damages in other other jurisdictions, see Glass v. Stahl Specialty Co., 97 Wash. 2d 880, 652
P.2d 948, 949-53 (1982); Adler, supra note 44, at 14-23; McNichols, supranote 182, at 16-24;
Note, Comparative Causation, Indemnity, and the Allocation of Losses Between Joint
Tortfeasors in Product Liability Cases, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 587, 587-96 (1979).
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employee, the apportionment of damages would be inequitable if
the employer were at fault.2 12 However, joint and several liability
should not be abandoned because there might be an unfair result
2 13
in one instance.
After Coney, Illinois courts will continue to equitably apportion damages by the operation of comparative negligence and
comparative contribution with joint and several liability of defendants. Comparative negligence determines the fault reduction of
the plaintiff vis-a-vis the defendants. 214 Contribution determines
215
the apportionment of plaintiffs damages among the defendants.
Neither comparative negligence nor contribution apportion liability according to the proportionate fault of all the parties
involved, plaintiff and defendants. 216 Each tortfeasor who proximately caused the plaintiffs injury remains liable for the total

212. In suits in which injuries occured before March 1, 1978, the effective date of the
contribution act, and in which trial had not commenced before June 8, 1981, the date of
application of comparative negligence, the defendant will be denied contribution but be
subject to comparative negligence. See supra note 81. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected
the argument that the different dates of application of both doctrines resulted in a denial
of equal protection to the defendants in these suits. Coney, No. 56306, slip op. at 13-14.
See supra note 89. See also Johnson v. Hoover Water Well Serv., Inc., 108 Ill. App. 3d 994,
1010, 439 N.E.2d 1284, 1296 (1982) (there is no legal reason for comparative negligence
and contribution to have the same effective date).
The Supreme Court of Alaska considered a similar claim in Arctic Structures, Inc. v.
Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979). The court found that the differential treatment of
tortfeasors who were held jointly and severally liable but could not seek contribution was
reasonably related to legitimate governmental objectives. Id. at 436-37.
213. It would have been more inequitable to place the loss on the plaintiff in Coney.
The loss due to physical injury has generally been recognized as more compensable than
economic loss in tort actions. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69,80-85,
435 N.E.2d 443, 448-51 (1982). See J. DooLEY, supranote 18, § 32.89, at 133; Bertschy, The
Economic Loss Doctrine in Illinois After Moorman, 71 ILL B.J. 346 (1983). The strictly
liable defendant is subject to economic loss, where plaintiffs decedent was physically
injured. In choosing between a negligent plaintiff and a strictly liable defendant to bear
the economic loss of plaintiffs (decedent's) injury and death caused by an immune tortfeasor in Coney, the court's selection of the strictly liable defendant was the logical and
fair choice. See Note, supranote 81, at 615 n. 202.
214. Seattle First Nat'l, 91 Wash. 2d at 238-39, 588 P.2d at 1314; Appel & Michael,
supra note 45, at 170; Comment, supra note 109, at 165-67.
215. J. DOOLEY, supra note 18, § 26.33, at 576; Note, supra note 51, at 352. See Johnson, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 109-11, 439 N.E.2d at 1295-96 (both comparative negligence and
comparative contribution equitably apportion responsibility for damages, but each rule
was designed for a different purpose).
216. Seattle First Nat'l, 91 Wash. 2d at 236-39, 588 P.2d at 1312-14. In the case of
multiple tortfeasors, one commentator suggests that comparative negligence "was
designed only to compute the amount of damages for contribution purposes, rather than to abolish joint and several liability and to provide a new system for ascertaining liability." Note, supra note 51, at 349.
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amount of damages reduced only by the percentage of the plain217
tiffs fault.
CONCLUSION
The Illinois Supreme Court adopted comparative contribution
and comparative negligence to apportion damages more equitably. This new system of loss allocation assessed responsibility
for damages on the basis of comparative fault and comparative
causation. In Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc., the court resolved
two important issues for loss allocation. The court decided that
comparative fault applies to strict products liability and that
joint and several liability survives comparative negligence. In its
opinion, the court successfully balanced the policy considerations of strict products liability and joint and several liability
with those of comparative negligence.
The Coney decision incorporated the comparative causation
analysis of Skinner and the comparative fault principle of Alvis
to apportion damages between a negligent plaintiff and a strictly
liable defendant. Plaintiffs damages are now proportionately
reduced by his causal fault in a strict products liability action.
However, plaintiffs fault does not include the reliance type of
contributory negligence. The court also affirmed the policy that
injured plaintiffs must be compensated. In retaining joint and
several liability, the court refused to shift the risk of an immune
or insolvent tortfeasor to the plaintiff. By applying comparative
negligence to strict products liability and retaining joint and
several liability, the Supreme Court of Illinois insured that the
Illinois loss allocation plan equitably apportions damages.
LOU ANN REICHLE

217.

Coney, slip op. 9, 13.

